Rebutting Burhan Gafoor – Part 7

January 26, 2015

This is part 7 of the rebuttal to Singapore High Commissioner to Australia Mr Burhan Gafoor’s “Response to Poh Soo Kai’s allegations”.

Mr Gafoor wrote:

The Barisan Sosialis was formed in July 1961 on the explicit instructions of Fong Chong Pik – aka “the Plen”, as Mr Lee Kuan Yew had named him in his Battle For Merger radio talks, “Plen” being short for the “Plenipotentiary” of the CPM who had first made contact with Mr Lee in 1957. Fong was the chief CPM representative and operative in Singapore. The Plen’s superior in the CPM was Eu Chooi Yip, who was based in Jakarta and in overall charge of the CPM’s operations in Singapore. Eu too confirmed in his memoirs that it was the Plen who instigated the formation of the Barisan. As the Barisan was the main CUF organisation, it was led by the top CPM open front leader in Singapore, Lim Chin Siong. Lim became secretary-general of the party while Dr Poh Soo Kai was its assistant secretary-general.

[Mr Gafoor’s reference: Chen Jian 陈剑(Chin Chong Cham, Lang Jian Zhu Meng – Yu Zhu Ye Kou Shu Li Shi Dang An 浪尖逐梦 – 余柱业口述历史档案 [Chasing Dreams on the Wave’s Crest], page 209]

Mr Gafoor could not even be consistent with his accusations in one paragraph. He first claimed that Fong Chong Pik instructed the formation of Barisan. But when quoting from his evidence, Mr Gafoor could only say Plen instigated Barisan’s formation. Explicit instruction and instigation are miles apart from each other. The former conveys the idea of authority, the latter doesn’t. From this alone, we can see that Mr Gafoor’s evidence doesn’t allow him to say what he wanted to say but he said it nonetheless – that Fong Chong Pik instructed Barisan’s formation.

Before we even bring in other evidences, we can already see the ridiculousness of Mr Gafoor’s assertion. Why would Lim Chin Siong, the undisputed leader of the Chinese masses, the centre of universe of Singapore’s political movement then, have needed instructions from Fong Chong Pik to form a new political party after being ousted from PAP? Did Chiam See Tong need instructions to form a new party after being ousted from his old party? Did JB Jeyaratnam need instructions to form a new party after deciding to part ways with his old party? In terms of gravitas and influence, Lim Chin Siong was so much larger than either Chiam See Tong or JB Jeyaratnam. What instructions did Lim Chin Siong need to form Barisan after being ousted from PAP?

Fong Chong Pik’s perspective

According to the book Mr Gafoor quoted, Fong Chong Pik had these to say about Lim Chin Siong:

Of course, Lim Chin Siong was the left-wing’s most important person. After the appearance of the “Plen”, he remained the most important left-wing person, one with even greater influence and authority …

If, as someone seems to have said, “No Lee Kuan Yew, no Singapore”, then it follows that, “No Lim Chin Siong, no Lee Kuan Yew”. But personally, I believe that a better way of expressing the historical truth is to put it as “Only with the existence of a Lim Chin Siong, could there have been a Lee Kuan Yew” … The three words “Lim Chin Siong” stand mightily, forming a brilliant light in the fire of anti-colonial struggle by the people of Singapore. He symbolized the fighting spirit of the people …

Lim Chin Siong was a heroic person who, in the most difficult time could unite, mobilize and provide leadership to all forces to struggle for a common cause …

When first appearing on the scene, he (Lim Chin Siong) already showed the abilities of generals and ministers … His achievements and illustrious name came from Heaven.

[Fong Chong Pik: The Memoirs of a Malayan Communist Revolutionary, page, 170, 175 – 177]

Could these be the words of someone who would order Lim Chin Siong around? Quite clearly, Fong Chong Pik greatly admired Lim Chin Siong and looked up to him as a general, minister and leader. Fong Chong Pik clearly would not have ordered Lim Chin Siong around let alone instructed him to form Barisan.

Eu Chooi Yip’s evidence

Mr Gafoor’s so-called evidence came from Eu Chooi Yip’s Chinese oral historical archive:

Lim (interviewer): What about Barisan’s set up? Whose initiative was it?

Eu: Also Fong Chong Pik. In fact, we believed at that time … yes, yes, he decided on the spot.

[translated from Eu Chooi Yip’s浪尖逐梦 – 余柱业口述历史档案]

But Eu also said on the same page:

Lim (interviewer): At the time of PAP’s founding in 1954, both sides cooperated, did the decision then come from the Central Committee?

Eu: The initiative came from Fong Chong Pik.

Lim (interviewer): But at the time of PAP’s founding in 1954 …

Eu: We completely didn’t know, even those of us in Indonesia also didn’t know. He was on the ground deciding everything, he sent people to participate. Fong Chong Pik was a man of action. Even though his rank in the party wasn’t very high, he hadn’t joined the party for long, but he was on the ground, made decisions on the spot, decided to cooperate with him (Lee Kuan Yew), participated in those activities. He had the approval of the central committee in everything that he did, the initiative … the great majority of the initiatives came from him …

Lim (interviewer): The split (of PAP), according to currently available information was due to the Anson by-election … in the year of ’61 after Tunku announced the Malaysia plan, Anson by-election, several union leaders proposed to abolish the Internal Security Act, and release all important PAP figures detained, it was the precursor to the split …

Eu: That can be said

Lim (interviewer): The decision then probably came from the Central Committee lah!

Eu: There were no obvious instructions from above; it was all based on the man on the ground Fong Chong Pik’s decision, because transport wasn’t convenient, not easy to explain the (transport) arrangement, our transport arrangement in the past was complicated. Because there was no radio station, we at first wanted to do this, no radio station, all through mail, mail means I write a letter to an Indonesian colleague, he hands (the letter) over to another colleague in the CCP, CCP then hands over to MCP, it’s very indirect, we do not have direct relationships, also not convenient to give too much detail in the letter. So we could only wait till there were people who went over, then we discussed in detail, after discussions we just gave a few principles for the local agent to carry out, could only be like this. So we in the South, in Singapore, in Indonesia, these activities, basically myself, Fong Chong Pik, these few people decided everything, and another person in charge in Indonesia, three persons, basically decided everything.

[translated from Eu Chooi Yip’s浪尖逐梦 – 余柱业口述历史档案, page 207-209]

So clearly from his oral history, we can see that Eu Chooi Yip wasn’t even in the action. He was in Indonesia and hardly in communication with Fong Chong Pik because of so called transport difficulties so much so that he didn’t know most of the major things that happened in Singapore when they happened. Eu Chooi Yip’s wasn’t a firsthand account, neither was it an up-to-date account given the lack of communication between Singapore and Indonesia. Given these circumstances, it would be difficult for any reasonable person to admit Eu’s evidence as being cast iron.

Other evidences from Eu Chooi Yip

Mr Gafoor shouldn’t have missed what Eu Chooi Yip discussed with Chin Peng in another book he quoted:

ECY (Eu Chooi Yip) argued strongly that there was an ever widening split between the PAP’s right-wing faction, led by Lee Kuan Yew, and a middle-of-the road group, seemingly headed by Sinnathamby Rajaratnam … There was also a third faction ECY identified as the ‘Chinese communal group’.

[Chin Peng: My Side of History]

Thus, even amongst themselves, Eu Chooi Yip didn’t refer to the faction that would eventually become the Barisan as one of their own but as a distinct ‘Chinese communal group’, not even a pro-communist group. So how could Fong Chong Pik have instructed the group that would eventually form Barisan to form Barisan when they were only a Chinese communal group and not a communist or pro-communist group?

It was for these reasons that perhaps Mr Gafoor was left with no choice but to eventually modify his use of the word “instructed” to “instigated”. But instigation means next to nothing in the context of the formation of Barisan. Would Lim Chin Siong, the star politician of his time needed instigation from anybody let alone Fong Chong Pik to form Barisan? Even if it had been true that Fong Chong Pik encouraged Lim Chin Siong to form Barisan, it would be a mistake for Mr Gafoor to think that Lim Chin Siong formed Barisan only because Fong Chong Pik said so or that Lim Chin Siong wouldn’t have formed Barisan had Fong Chong Pik not suggested so.

Mr Gafoor omitted Dr Lee Siew Choh

It was strange for Mr Gafoor to refer to Barisan as being led by so-called top ‘CPM open front leader’ Lim Chin Siong without ever mentioning Barisan chairman Dr Lee Siew Choh throughout his entire letter. Dr Lee Siew Choh was never charged with being a communist and never once served time under the Internal Security act. Mr Gafoor knows this and so could not drag the good name of Dr Lee Siew Choh into his communist accusations. But without dragging Dr Lee Siew Choh into the picture, Mr Gafoor inevitably left a gaping loophole in his battery of accusations. How could CPM have led Barisan without Barisan chairman Dr Lee Siew Choh ever being a ‘CPM open front leader’ himself? That would be like accusing PAP of being led by some outlawed group through Secretary General Lee Kuan Yew when Party Chairman Dr Toh Chin Chye was never a part of that outlawed group.

Didn’t Mr Gafoor accuse Barisan of reverting to CPM’s original and real intentions in 1965 when it rejected Singapore’s independence as being phony? But by then, Lim Chin Siong was already locked away and could no longer serve as the so-called ‘CPM open front leader’. The main person left carrying on the fight for Barisan was Dr Lee Siew Choh. But Dr Lee Siew Choh was never a communist or a ‘CPM front leader’. It was Mr Gafoor who said that Operation Coldstore had targeted communists. But wave after wave of Operation Coldstores never targeted Dr Lee Siew Choh. Dr Lee Siew Choh was never once targeted by any operation. Going by Mr Gafoor’s logic, Dr Lee Siew Choh shouldn’t have been a communist. In that case, on what basis does Mr Gafoor insist that non-communist Dr Lee Siew Choh had led Barisan in seeking to revert to CPM’s original and real intentions in 1965?

If Mr Gafoor had truly and sincerely believed in the evidence that he quoted from Chin Peng, that Operation Coldstore had shattered CPM’s underground network, how could he continue to insist that three years after CPM’s shattering in 1962, Barisan continued to be led by CPM open front leaders seeking to revert to CPM intentions?

Such was the irony of Mr Gafoor’s piecemeal and uncoordinated accusations, he achieved nothing except to confirm that he is the Number 1 culprit of selective evidence that he accused others of.

Rebutting Burhan Gafoor – Part 6

January 15, 2015

This is part 6 of the rebuttal to Singapore High Commissioner to Australia Mr Burhan Gafoor’s “Response to Poh Soo Kai’s allegations”.

Mr Gafoor made sweeping statement that wasn’t true

Mr Gafoor wrote:

That the security operation was targeted at the communists and their supporters – not mere democratic opponents of the PAP – has been affirmed by no less an authority than the CPM secretary-general Chin Peng. He acknowledged in his memoirs that he had expected such a crackdown and had advised his cadres and followers to take the necessary precautions. He expressed regret that they did not do so, as Operation Coldstore, in his words, “shattered our underground network throughout the island”. “Those who escaped the police net went into hiding. Many fled to Indonesia”. Clearly, Operation Coldstore had not targeted innocent, non-communist “socialists”.

[Mr Gafoor’s reference: Chin Peng: My Side of History, page 439]

Mr Gafoor was referring to this paragraph from Chin Peng’s memoirs:

Working from prepared name lists, the raiding parties managed to seize 115 suspects. Among them was James Puthucheary. The Singapore crackdown we had been expecting for almost four years had, in fact, only materialised after strong pressure on Lee from both Tunku and the British. Our deliberations with ECY two years earlier had correctly forecast the event, but had failed to visualise putting in place any form of effective countermeasures. My plea to ‘prepare for the worst’ had been to no avail. Operation Cold Store shattered our underground network throughout the island. Those who escaped the police net went into hiding. Many fled to Indonesia.

Thus, Chin Peng didn’t say that all 115 Operation Coldstore detainees were part of the underground network shattered. Neither did Chin Peng say that the 24 Barisan members seized were part of that underground network. Chin Peng did not say who or how many amongst Operation Coldstore detainees were part of his underground network. Therefore, Mr Gafoor cannot conveniently assume that all 115 Operation Coldstore detainees were part of Chin Peng’s underground network. As long as 1 out of the 115 Operation Coldstore detainees wasn’t part of Chin Peng’s underground network, Mr Gafoor has not right to make the sweeping statement that Operation Coldstore targeted communists or that Operation Coldstore had not targeted innocent non-communists.

The usual fate of communists caught then was either exile or banishment to China. According to this list of Singapore political detainees (http://remembering1987.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/political-detainees-in-singapore-1950-2013.pdf), only 6 out of 123 Operation Coldstore detainees suffered this fate with one more banished to India. Effectively, only 7 out of 123 Operation Coldstore detainees were potentially part of the underground network that Chin Peng mentioned. Thus, the great majority of Operation Coldstore detainees were unlikely to be communists or part of Chin Peng’s underground network. Mr Gafoor was therefore a lot more wrong than right when he said that Operation Coldstore targeted communists who were part of Chin Peng’s underground network.

Furthermore on page 438 of the same book, Chin Peng said:

But neither Dr Lee Siew Chor … nor, I understand it, other prominent opposition figures like the Puthucheary brothers – James and Dominic – had ever been CPM members.

It would be strange for Chin Peng to deny that James Puthucheary was a CPM member on page 438 only to admit on page 439 that James was part of the CPM underground network shattered by Operation Coldstore.

Shattering of CPM underground could mean its complete withdrawal from Singapore

Chin Peng’s words can be better understood by referring to another book that Mr Gafoor referred to where Fong Chong Pik wrote:

By 1961-62, the CPM’s underground organizations in Singapore were feeling it a great burden just to take care of the safety of the cadres who were avoiding arrests. The pressure had become so heavy that it was most difficult to handle. Any person who was not personally involved simply cannot imagine how difficult it was …

It was around the end of 1961, in accordance with suggestions relayed to me from the rest of the working group in Indonesia, that we began the task of withdrawing in small groups a total of more than 50 male and female cadres from the island. The withdrawal was conducted smoothly. Those cadres who were believed to have exposed themselves and whose safety was therefore threatened were taken out on a priority basis. As a result, practically the entire effective strength of the organization was withdrawn. Just think, on such a tiny island cadres would be left whose safety was not threatened? We successfully preserved the cadres, but our struggle in Singapore began to wane and eventually failed.

[Fong Chong Pik: The Memoirs of a Malayan Communist Revolutionary, page 172]

Thus, Chin Peng’s shattering of CPM underground network could refer to the complete withdrawal of the CPM underground from Singapore resulting in the waning and eventual failure of CPM underground in Singapore. There are thus other possible interpretations to Chin Peng’s shattering of CPM underground network. Mr Gafoor cannot be so adamant with his accusations when his evidence can be interpreted in more than one way.

In another book, Chin Peng referred to Barisan members taken during Operation Cold Store as “them” not “us”. Chin Peng thus differentiated Barisan from CPM.

… Lee Kuan Yew seized the opportunity to have the Barisan Socialis leaders arrested in Operation Cold Store (February 1963), branding opponents of Malaya as pro-Indonesian. This harmed them badly at a time …

[Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on the Malayan Communist Party, C. C. Chin and Karl Hack, page 320]

Specific examples of non-communists detained during Operation Coldstore

Lim Chin Siong was detained during Operation Coldstore and since Mr Gafoor was so fond of quoting from Chin Peng, he should take note that Chin Peng never regarded Lim Chin Siong a communist:

Chin Peng: I don’t think so. I don’t think so. Lim Chin Siong never admitted he was Communist Party member.

[Dialogues with Chin Peng: New light on the Malayan Communist Party, C C Chin & Karl Hack, page 191]

Dr Lim Hock Siew was taken away during Operation Coldstore when his son was only 5 years old. Why would Dr Lim choose to be incarcerated for close to 20 years when a simple renunciation of communism would have set him free? Dr Lim’s 20 year steadfast stance against renouncing communism because he was no communist in the first place was more than sufficient proof that he was never a communist.

Why Barisan legislative assemblymen spared from Operation Coldstore?

Straits Times reported that all Barisan legislative assemblymen were spared from Operation Coldstore. So if Mr Gafoor was correct, that Operation Coldstore only targeted communists, it would mean that only non-elected Barisan members were communist because only they were caught during Operation Coldstore. On the other hand, elected Barisan members were non-communist since they were spared from Operation Coldstore. That would mean that communist or non-communist laid in the hands of voters. Voters decided who was communist and who wasn’t which would be quite ridiculous. The fact that PAP didn’t touch any Barisan legislative assemblymen during Operation Coldstore showed that this was more than anything else a political operation.

In all, 113 people were rounded up, including 24 Barisan members, 21 trade union leaders, 17 Nanyang University (Nantah) students and graduates, seven members of rural associations, and five journalists.

However, all 13 Barisan legislative assemblymen and party chairman Lee Siew Choh were spared.

[Straits Times, ‘I was interrogated day and night for six months’, 10 Sept 2009]

Conclusion

Mr Gafoor was wrong to make sweeping statements about Operation Coldstore targeting non-innocent communists solely on the basis of Chin Peng’s statement that Operation Coldstore had shattered his underground network. Chin Peng didn’t say that all 123 Operation Coldstore detainees belonged to his underground network. As long as one Operation Coldstore detainee had been innocent, it would be unfair for Mr Gafoor to claim without qualification that Operation Coldstore detainees had been non-innocent communists. It is not difficult to find Operation Coldstore detainees who were innocent, most notable of which was Dr Lim Siew Hock.

Worse still, only a tiny fraction of Operation Coldstore detainees were banished to China, suggesting that the great majority of detainees weren’t communists which in turn implies that Mr Gafoor was probably a lot more wrong than right in making the sweeping statement that Operation Coldstore targeted non-innocent communists.

These together with other evidences show that the basis of Mr Gafoor’s accusations is rather weak and doesn’t stand up to the scrutiny of a more robust evaluation of all evidences concerning Operation Coldstore.

Rebutting Burhan Gafoor – Part 5

January 7, 2015

This is part 5 of the rebuttal to Singapore High Commissioner to Australia Mr Burhan Gafoor’s “Response to Poh Soo Kai’s allegations”.

Mr Gafoor said:

Dr Poh now says that Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965 proved that Barisan’s position on merger in 1961-62 was correct. This is yet another reversal of position. In 1965, following separation, the Barisan had condemned Singapore’s independence, characterising it as “phony” … They never believed that Singapore should be independent of Malaysia and had opposed merger in 1963 merely for tactical reasons …

No reversal from Dr Poh

Before that, Dr Poh said:

The 1963 merger was a wrong decision. The disastrous outcome was foreseen by the opposition Barisan Sosialis. We wanted reunification with Malaya, but NOT on the terms that Lee obtained. Those simply could not work.

Contrary to what Mr Gafoor said, Dr Poh didn’t make any reversal at all. Barisan’s foreseeing of the disastrous merger with Malaysia under unfair terms by the PAP was recorded in black and white for posterity:

Mr Lim Chin Siong, secretary-general of the Barisan Sosialis, has personally pledged to Tengku Abdul Rahman his party’s support of the merger and Malaysia principles …

Mr. Lim told a press conference today: “I was prompted to write to the Tengku, for, like the Tengku, we are deeply concerned with the dangerous drift towards communalism in our political situation …

“Our policy has always been to achieve a permanent basis for unity.

“It is for this reason that we have opposed the PAP’s constitutional proposal. We believe that it would be disastrous to national unity.”

[The Straits Times, 30 March 1962, Page 16, Mystery letter: It was from Lim]

No Barisan reversal in 1965 vis-à-vis 1961/62

Mr Gafoor cannot say that there had been a Barisan reversal in 1965 vis-à-vis 1961/62 since Barisan had already started to support merger sometime between 1961 and 1962. Mr Gafoor should not twist Barisan’s opposition to unfair terms of the merger as opposition to genuine merger. Barisan supported, not opposed genuine merger with Malaya:

Mr. Bani declared: “We have stated in the past very clearly that we want merger. We have stated that we want complete merger.

“We have stated that we want a merger which is genuine and which can bring about genuine national unity.

“We have also stated that in our view merger arrangements which will create different classes of citizens will only further disunity among our people, which will deny the people of Singapore a common political life with their brothers and sisters in the Federation, will not constitute genuine merger, will not bring about genuine national unity.”

The Prime Minister had described the Government’s offer as realistic alternatives. The Barisan Sosialis disputed this because the people should not be compelled to choose one of these alternatives simply because the PAP considered them realistic.

And he asserted: “When the PAP say that these alternatives are realistic, what they do in fact mean is that these are terms which are acceptable to the Government of the Federation of Malaya.

“Surely what the Federation Government is prepared to accept is not necessarily good for Singapore, is not necessarily fair for the people of Singapore.

“We refuse to accept a position where merger terms for Singapore are dictated by a handful of people in the Federation.

“The fate of the people of Singapore should not be made to depend on the charity of the few men who hold power in their hands in the Federation.”

Merger was inevitable but if the terms obtainable now were not satisfactory, then we will have to wait, Mr. Bani declared.

[The Straits Times, 12 July 1962, Page 5, Referendum: Bid to pose 4th question defeated]

… The chairman of the party, Dr. Lee Siew Choh, read out the letter, and the Tengku’s reply – neither proved to be a political bombshell – following taunts from the (PAP) Government benches regarding its contents …

The Barisan Sosialis letter, signed by the party’s Secretary-General, Mr. Lim Chin Siong …

… Mr. Lim told reporters: “It has never been my intention to make political capital out of my correspondence with the Tengku. “Unfortunately, the desperate PAP leaders have again seen fit to distort my correspondence with the Tengku. “In order to expose the lies of these political bankrupts. I regret that I had to reveal the text of the letters.” …

Dear Tengku.

We gladly welcome your desire to see the creation of one country sharing a common feeling, outlook and destiny. We wish to assure you that in this desire for national unity, we are completely with you.

Like you, we also want to see that nothing will come about that may cause any disruption to the present harmony existing among the people of our country.

We feel that much of the unhappy feelings about Singapore have arisen from a lack of opportunities for apparently divergent views to be adequately discussed so that a happy and lasting solution could be obtained for the benefit of all our people.

And we feel that a free and frank exchange of views and discussion between us can contribute a great deal towards national unity.

[The Straits Times, 12 July 1962, Page 1, wrote to TENGKU]

Fundamental issues with merger should not be ignored

Mr Gafoor should not ignore fundamental issues pointed out by Barisan that weren’t resolved prior to our hasty merger with Malaya that ultimately resulted in our expulsion from Malaysia in 1965.

… The Barisan Sosialis today charged that the People’s Action Party was now “more keen in appeasing the communal prejudices of the Federation Government than of advancing the interests of the people it pretended to represent.”

… the Barisan Sosialis said that the P.A.P. was more keen on arguing why the people of Singapore should be given only second-rate citizenship status in Malaysia, and not equal Federal citizenship like the people in the other 14 States of Malaysia.

The Barisan statement said the P.A.P. had failed to reply to the “important” question of why, of all the 15 States in the proposed Malaysia, Singapore should be the only State where the people would not possess equal Federal citizenship status.

It said that the P.A.P. had again attempted to confuse the people that automatic conversion of Singapore citizenship to Federal citizenship on merger would mean the disenfranchisement of 340,000 Singapore citizens.

It charged that this was “a falsehood and a deliberate distortion of the factual position.”

The statement said that automatic Federal citizenship status for Singapore citizens simply meant that every one of the 624,000 persons who had been considered worthy to be citizens of Singapore automatically should be considered worthy to be citizens of the Federation on merger.

“This is the only sane and honest way to safeguard the interests of the people of Singapore.” it said.

[The Straits Times, 14 February 1962, Page 18, Citizenship: Barisan again attacks the P.A.P.]

The Barisan Sosialis today claimed that the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s pledge on citizenship yesterday was “virtually an admission” that there was in fact no equality for Singapore citizens under the proposed merger and Malaysia arrangements …

The Barisan in its statement said: “If it were really true that the Federal Government is willing to grant absolute equality to Singapore citizens, why won’t it simply grant us all Federal citizenship just as it is prepared to grant to all the citizens of the Borneo territories?

“Surely that will be the most reassuring way to make us all equal in status with Federal citizens?

“Why then this insistence on a complicated arrangement of two types of citizenship?”

“If we are really meant to be equal, why not have just one common citizenship for all the people and be done with it?”

[The Straits Times, 5 June 1962, Page 16, Why not common citizenship for all? asks Barisan]

The Barisan Sosialis chairman, Dr. Lee Siew Choh, said today that the Referendum Bill, if it became law, would ask the people of Singapore to choose between two types of merger, both of which were unacceptable to the majority of the people.

… Dr. Lee charged that the “referendum plot” was devised by the People’s Action Party because it knew its merger proposals would be rejected by the people.

He said that realising its proposals would be rejected in a one-question referendum, the PAP added a worse proposal – the Penang or Malacca type of merger – and distorted it as the Barisan Sosialis stand.

Dr. Lee said: “Thus, the PAP hope the people will be driven to a position where they will have to support the PAP. Of course, to make doubly sure the notorious undemocratic and unheard-of-in-world-history blank paper clause is put in to prevent the people from even throwing in a blank vote when faced with two unacceptable alternatives.”

He dismissed the Penang-Malacca-type of merger as a distortion of the Barisan stand and as “a fiction of the imaginative minds of the P.A.P. leaders.”

[The Straits Times, 18 June 1962, Page 6, Both alternatives in referendum not acceptable: Dr. Lee]

Not true Barisan never believed that Singapore should be independent

Mr Gafoor was also wrong to say that Barisan never believed that Singapore should be independent of Malaysia. Barisan and those who would eventually become Barisan leaders have been asking for independence in 1957, since 1959 and in 1961.

Lee stated later in his memoirs that Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and Woodhull had been “stirring up demands for an independent Singapore without a merger” from the time of their release from detention in Jun 1959.

[The University Socialist Club and the Contest for Malaya: Tangled Strands of Modernity, Edgar Liao and Cheng Tju Lim and Guo Quan Seng, page 173]

At the Anson by-election on 15 July, Lim Chin Siong and seven other left-wing PAP assemblymen withheld support from the government’s candidate and instead backed David Marshall … who stood for immediate independence.

[Malaysia, A. J. Stockwell, page 145]

What did the pro-communists want Lee to fight for in London? It was immediate independence. This was their goal, and the reason why Lim Chin Siong had supported Marshall all the way in the failed negotiations of the previous year.

[Singapore: The Unexpected Nation, Edwin Lee, page 141]

Thus, while it can be said that Barisan updated its position between 1961 and 1962 in response to the inevitability of merger, it cannot be said that Barisan reversed its position in 1965 vis-à-vis 1961-62 since Barisan’s position had been consistent from 1961-62 to 1965.

There was basis to Singapore’s phony independence

Mr Gafoor should acknowledge that Barisan’s characterization of Singapore’s independence in 1965 as phony wasn’t without basis. Singapore was so weak then militarily that even Third World countries questioned Dr Toh Chin Chye whether Singapore could be independent. Rajaratnam had to admit that Singapore’s defense remained the concern of big powers as Singapore was dependent on, not independent of, big powers for defense. The severe constriction of space for foreign affairs that involved Malaysia, the refusal of the Malaysian 4th brigade to leave Singapore, the large British military presence in Singapore, all these pointed to a lack of real independence or a sense of phoniness to our independence in 1965.

Yet he (Lee Kuan Yew) was still empty-handed in 1965: the small Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) consisted of two infantry battalions (1SIR and 2SIR) comprising approximately fifty officers, a thousand enlisted men, and fewer than two thousand rifles. A few days after the separation from Malaysia, Lee lamented that Singapore “would be finished” if, for example, Indonesia decided to invade the island with only a tenth of its force … Toh Chin Chye … reported that even ministers from relatively small African countries asked him, “How could you be an independent country – no Army, no Navy and no Air Force?”

When the British government decided in 1968 to speed up the retreat of its forces east of the Suez Canal, Singapore was left virtually defenseless … In January 1969, Lee admitted that Singapore might need to employ mercenaries to defend itself. And S. Rajaratnam … publicly admitted that the defense of Singapore had to “remain the concern of big powers.”

Malaysian politicians mercilessly exploited the military vulnerability of Singapore between 1965 and 1969. In 1965, they prohibited Singapore from trading with Indonesia … In 1966 … Lee watched helplessly as the Malaysian government “resettled” the Sarawak Chinese community … accusing it of cooperating with the predominantly Chinese Clandestine Communist organization (CCO). The Sarawak United People’s Party, traditionally an ally of Lee’s People’s Action Party (PAP), asked him to protest the Malaysian decisions, but he was too weak to defend even his own island, Singapore.

Lee remained silent on the issue of the Sarawak Chinese community, mainly because he did not wish to provide Malaysian leaders with a pretext to invade Singapore. Fears about such impending invasion ran high in Singapore between 1965 and 1969 …

Malaysian politicians also manipulated their military forces in Singapore, as well as the separation agreement, in order to limit Singapore’s efforts to build its own credible defense force … They argued that Lee did not need to build a strong defense force, since Malaysia was responsible for the defense of Singapore. Naturally, Lee resented such an interpretation of the separation treaty, but being militarily “empty-handed,” …

Between 1965 and 1967, Malaysia refused to evacuate its Fourth Brigade and one of its infantry regiments from Singapore. Justifying such unusual behavior, its leaders argued that the separation agreement allowed them to maintain “bases and facilities” in Singapore for military purposes. The presence of these forces led to a full-scale diplomatic crisis between the two countries when, in February 1966, the 2SIR (2nd Singaporean Infantry Regiment) returned home from a long arduous mission in Sabah, only to find its camp occupied by the Malaysian Fourth Brigade. The Fourth Brigade also refused to hand back military signal and transport equipment vital to the new SAF …

The buildup of the SAF was further complicated because much of its manpower nucleus consisted of officers and soldiers who had been serving in the Malaysian defense forces at the time of separation. For their part, Singaporean manpower planners were delighted to release back to Malaysia several hundred Malaysian citizens serving in 1SIR and 2SIR. The Malaysians, however, were less eager to release Singaporean officers and soldiers back to Singapore … Lim Kim San … admitted in December 1968 that his ministry did not even know exactly how many Singaporeans were serving in the Malaysian defense forces as of August 9, 1965 (Singapore’s first Independence Day).

[A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States, Alon Peled, page 100-102]

They (Barisan) also referred to the presence of British bases and about 55,000 “occupation troops”, the presence of Malaysian units, the Pulau Senang barter trade “fiasco,” the Camp Temasek incident, and the “flare-up of tempers in Kuala Lumpur” when Indonesia wanted to recognise Singapore …

The statements also pledged to fight for “a genuinely independent, democratic united Malaya.”
In winding up the conference, Dr. Lee claimed that Malaya, including Singapore, was at present a police state.

[The Straits Times, 8 October 1966, Page 1, Barisan MPs quit]

Dr Lee said: “It is all a phoney and a humbug. There is no real independence.

“All the powers are not in the hands of the Singapore Government. For example, on foreign affairs matters, they have to get the approval from the Central Government before they can do anything.”

The Barisan leader also criticised the manner in which Singapore came out of Malaysia.

“Which leader of the people negotiates for his country’s independence in secret?” he asked.

“Mr. Lee Kuan Yew did it because he knows that it is not real independence …”

[The Straits Times, 16 August 1965, Page 4, Independence? It’s phoney—Dr. Lee]

Dr Lim Hock Siew’s explanation of phony independence

According to Dr Lim Hock Siew’s oral history record, there was indeed a theoretical basis to Dr Lee Siew Choh’s phony independence although Dr Lim disagreed that it should have been made into a campaign matter. He also confirmed that the majority of ISA detainees weren’t happy with the constant harping on phony independence.

Lim (interviewer): What was the general attitude of the detainees towards the Barisan’s stand to call [it a] phoney independence?

LHS: Firstly there was no consultation with the detainees inside the prison on this issue. There was no possibility of a consultation anyway. And that stand was taken by Dr Lee Siew Choh, and others in the Barisan Sosialis, who [were] outside prison. The majority of the detainees inside prison of course were not happy with this stand. The question of whether a country is independent or not has to be viewed from several planes, of course from the viewpoint of socialists, we do not consider a state to be genuinely independent unless the people of that state has gained economic independence because that is the basis of political independence. Unless you are economically self-reliant, you cannot be politically self-reliant. But that is going into theories of political economy. From the viewpoint of international politics, especially international law, a state is independent if it is recognised by other countries. And has gained admission to the United Nations. And under those criteria there was no doubt Singapore was independent from the viewpoint of international law.

Many of us in prison strongly felt that it was certainly not wise for the Barisan Sosialis to constantly harp on the slogan of phoney independence. For that would be to indulge in academic politics and it would most likely create confusion rather than conviction amongst the public and also even among many of our followers. It is a different matter if you talk about what is real independence, with our own cadres, so that our own cadres knew what to struggle for. But to talk about such things to a general population it would lead only to confusion. And it would also divert attention from issues which are more tangible to the people. So from that point of view many of us were very unhappy about the Barisan Sosialis leaders constantly harping on Singapore’s independence at that time being a phoney independence. Although in theory, in political theory we do not disagree with that because I have already stated, independence from a socialist viewpoint means total economic independence – together with a freedom of our people from domination from all foreign military forces. And at that time there were a lot of foreign military forces stationed within Singapore, and obviously from that point of view, it was not genuine independence. But again this point led to a lot of happiness among the detainees within prison. There was I remember continuous debate on this issue for a long time to come.

Lim (interviewer): Was there any consensus among the detainees?

LHS: There was no organized debate in that sense although later on more to avert or to avoid open antagonism with the Barisan Sosialis’ stand outside prison, most of the detainees did not take any opposing views.

Lim (Interviewer): So in other words on the Barisan’s phoney independence stance, there were two …

LHS: Yes, both within prison and outside prison.

Lim (interviewer): Among the detainees there were some who supported and some against.

LHS: Well, nobody opposed the socialist viewpoint that Singapore was not genuinely independent. On that score, from that angle there was no disagreement. The whole disagreement is whether we should harp on this as a main propaganda line against the PAP.

Lim (Interviewer): Was this feeling communicated to Barisan’s leaders through relatives?

LHS: Not that I know of, but I believe the Barisan Socialist leaders outside must have been aware of this. Because there was also disagreement among the Barisan Sosialis cadres outside prison and I later on came to hear that there was also intense debate on this issue outside prison. How the debate proceeded I was not aware of.

[Oral history of Dr Lim Hock Siew, Nation Archives of Singapore, Accession number: 000214, Project Title: Political History in Singapore 1945-1965]

Significant disagreement within Barisan on phony independence

Mr Gafoor should also note the intense internal disagreements within Barisan to Dr Lee Siew Choh’s phony independence and how the majority of Barisan were against Dr Lee in rejecting phony independence.

Two more Barisan Sosialis MPs, Mr. Kow Kee Seng (Paya Lebar) and Mr. Chio Cheng Thun (Chua Chu Kang), broke away from their party today.

The break was announced in hand-written Press statements in Chinese, which strongly denounced Dr. Lee Siew Choh, the Barisan Sosialis chairman, and his policies.

Their move, following closely upon Mr. Lim Huan Boon’s resignation from Parliament and leadership of the Barisan Opposition, have brought the party’s internal dissentions further into the open.

Both Mr. Kow and Mr. Chio are strongly backed by at least 22 of the party’s 30 supporting unions.
Their statement today voiced some of the arguments already advanced by these unions against Dr. Lee’s policies.

It was a fallacy, they said, to think that Singapore’s independence was “phoney”.
Independence must be accepted as an accomplished fact, and re-unification between Singapore and

Malaya must be the long-term objective of every political party in the country.

Both … urged that political detainees be released as soon as possible “for the good name of Singapore’s independence and for the unity of the people.”

… Since Dr. Lee’s return to the Barisan Sosialis, unity in the party has been sabotaged … Is there any wonder that the party has committed so many mistakes and come to the mistaken conclusion that Singapore’s independence is phoney …

[The Straits Times, 8 January 1966, Page 9, Two more MPs quit Barisan]

The former Barisan Sosialis Opposition leader in Parliament, Mr. Lim Huan Boon, said …”I cannot in good conscience draw $500 a month for not doing what my voters elected me to do.” He was convinced that the present Barisan Sosialis boycott of Parliament was basically wrong. “By boycotting Parliament, we have broken faith with not only the democratic system but with the people who elected us,” … He said that many Barisan Sosialis rank and file supporters did not accept the “ridiculous thesis” that Singapore’s independence was “phoney”.

[The Straits Times, 6 January 1966, Page 6, ‘Conscience won’t let me draw $500 a month’]

Dr Lee of course retorted to these Barisan breakaways in a way that further reinforced the notion of phony independence.

“Surely by asking the PAP to make independence more perfect, both of them are contradicting themselves because it clearly shows the independence we have now to be phoney.”

[The Straits Times, 11 January 1966, Page 20, Barisan expels 2 ‘stab in back’ MPs]

It would thus be more accurate for Mr Gafoor to speak of Dr Lee Siew Choh harping on phony independence rather than Barisan harping on phony independence.

Parliament boycott wasn’t communist struggle but protest against death of democracy

Mr Gafoor wrote:

… Barisan … also withdrew from the Parliament of independent Singapore, declaring its preference to carry out “extra-parliamentary struggle”. The Barisan in effect reverted to the CPM’s original and real position … that “extra-parliamentary struggle” was superior to constitutional politics. The reality is that the CPM and the Barisan had all along acted, in Chin Peng’s words, “in the best interests of our Party” … And they never believed that they should restrict themselves to constitutional means to attain their political ends.

Mr Gafoor should note the true and valid reasons for Barisan’s withdrawal from parliament. Barisan MP Mr Chia Thye Poh was on record to say that Singapore parliamentary democracy had been dead while Dr Lim Hock Siew further explained that there was hardly any parliament then with just one Assembly meeting in the whole of 1965 or 1964. Why take issue with Barisan boycotting parliament when parliament was already dead then?

Mr Chia Thye Poh told reporters: I have just tendered our resignations from the House. We cannot remain in Parliament because parliamentary democracy is dead … What is the use of saying in Parliament when the PAP stop us from speaking? What is the use of going in Parliament when there is no democracy? There will only be democracy when the PAP hold general elections under the eight conditions we have made.

The eight conditions include unconditional release of all political detainees, revision of “undemocratic” election laws and revocation of “all undemocratic” laws.

[The Straits Times, 9 October 1966, Page 1, The B-I-G Barisan flop]

Lim (Interviewer): Then in November ’65, Barisan called for a boycott of parliament. How did you react to it?

LHS: It was I think in mid-November when we read in the papers of the Barisan Sosialis calling for a boycott of Parliament of all its 13 assemblymen. Again we were not given prior notice of this decision. And in prison, most of the detainees were also quite confused about the objectives of this dramatic move. The Barisan Sosialis statement I remember was published quite fully in the Chinese newspapers, but not in The Straits Times. From what was reported in the Chinese newspapers, we gathered that the boycott was to protest against the lack of democratic freedom in parliament and also within Singapore. The party gave I think about nine of ten conditions under which they would be prepared to go back to parliament. Those conditions include the immediate and unconditional release of all political detainees; the restoration of all political rights of those who have been released; the allowance of those who have already been banished to return back to the country; the gaining of full press freedom; the fundamental rights of public assembly, association, and freedom of expression and so on. Because at that time there was a total ban of public rallies, public assemblies and public meetings. It also revealed that throughout the period when Singapore was in Malaysia there were hardly any meetings called of the parliament, of the Assembly. In fact it revealed that in the whole of 1965, or ’64 there was only one meeting called in the Assembly, and that was to pass the budget, the state budget and that was rushed through within a few hours. After which the Assembly closed shop again and for all intents and purposes there was no Assembly in Singapore.

This statement highlighted the total suppression of the democratic rights of those assemblymen. And highlighted the fact that the parliament was reduced to meaningless shambles and that any further continuation of the Barisan Sosialis assemblymen’s participation in that parliament would merely enhance the prestige of a meaningless parliament. To that extent, everybody agreed that there should be something dramatic done to highlight this lack of democratic freedom in this country. But the disagreement arose from how long this boycott was to take place, and the circumstances that this boycott was to end. There was a lack of knowledge on the real aims of this campaign. Was it merely to highlight the lack of democracy within the country or was it a decision by the party to totally forgo this participation in elections, and participation in parliamentary politics. On this we were not clear because there was no communication between the leaders outside and the political detainees inside prison.

So most of us decided we should keep an open mind and to see how the situation developed. In fact we inside did not know that appalling extent to which the PAP had suppressed the rights of assemblymen in Parliament. And we did not realize that throughout one whole year there was only one meeting of the Assembly and only for a few hours merely to rush through a budget and the statement also pointed out that on such an important issue as a separation of Singapore from Malaysia, the assemblymen were not even consulted, the matter was not even debated in Parliament. That Lee Kuan Yew merely decided it on his own. An arbitrary decision by a group of political leaders without consultation with the elected members on such a important issue had reduced Parliament to a mockery. That was a very important point, because you would recall when PAP wanted to foist its phoney merger onto Singapore he had to stage a mock referendum, a sham referendum to give the impression that the people was consulted. But on this equally important issue of taking away Singapore from Malaysia, nobody was consulted – not even Parliament. So this was an insult to the Assembly in Singapore.

So on all these points, unfortunately, the Straits Times just completely refused to publish. The Straits Times publication of the Barisan statement was very brief. And had the Barisan Sosialis went out of its way to campaign along these points in order to focus public attention on the lack of democratic freedom in this country that has forced it to boycott a meaningless Parliament, then it would have been a very effective propaganda campaign against the PAP. But because of the apparent lack of explanation of the aims of this campaign among the leaders outside prison, there was I believe utter confusion and also disunity among the ranks of Barisan Sosialis leaders on this issue. And that made it extremely difficult for the Barisan Sosialis leaders to carry out any effective campaign along those lines.

[Oral history of Dr Lim Hock Siew, Nation Archives of Singapore, Accession number: 000214, Project Title: Political History in Singapore 1945-1965]

Nothing communist about Barisan’s extra-parliamentary struggle

Mr Gafoor should note that Barisan’s extra-parliamentary struggle was nothing more than rallies and house to house campaigns that were nothing extraordinary. All political parties do that, including PAP so there should be nothing particularly communist about it.

Their boycott of the House – from the very first meeting of the new session on Dec. 8 last year – was in protest against the “undemocratic acts” of the Government.

Party representatives will … hand over the letters of resignation. Immediately after that, police permits would be sought for rallies and house-to-house campaigns to explain the reason for the boycott of Parliament and the resignations.

The party chairmain, Dr Lee Siew Choh, indicated today that this would be the party’s new strategy – to continue its struggle outside the Parliament.

He told a press conference at Barisan headquarters that the decision to ask all the MPs to resign was taken about a fortnight ago …

Dr Lee claimed that the move would “expose the People’s Action Party and Singapore’s phoney independence.” …

Asked what he had to say about Government charges that his party was pro-Communist, Dr. Lee said that it it was really so, then the party could be taken to court.

The ruling PAP had killed Parliamentary democracy, he said …

The statements also indicated that in house-to-house campaigns, Barisan cadres would touch on work permits, changing of identity-cards, licensing of hawkers and taxis, increased school fees for children of non-citizens, quotas and tariffs, and changes to the Industrial Relations Ordinance.

[The Straits Times, 8 October 1966, Page 1, Barisan MPs quit]

Mr Gafoor should not be too quick to attribute Barisan’s actions as being for the best interests of the Communist Party of Malaya when even the Tunku admitted then that Lim Chin Siong and the Barisan weren’t communists:

Receipt of Mr. Lim’s letter was announced by the Tengku … The Tengku … said that he would not describe the letter as “having come from a Communist.”

The Prime Minister had also added: “I don’t think they are Communists but we know who they are.”

[The Straits Times, 30 March 1962, Page 16, Mystery letter: It was from Lim]

Don’t blame Barisan for PAP’s abuse of constitutional politics

Mr Gafoor cannot blame Barisan preferring extra-parliamentary struggle over constitutional politics when constitutional politics had been so severely abused by PAP for so long that it no longer served any purpose other than to confirm its uselessness. Mr Gafoor should be most aware of vile PAP tactics like delaying opposition candidates until it was too late for them to file their nomination papers that continue to happen till this day.

… On 22 April 1963, the party and its supporters marched on City Hall to protest their comrades’ detentions. A confrontation with the police ensued, following which 12 more Barisan leaders were arrested. Their court cases began in early August and ended on the 29th, just a few days before Lee announced snap elections. Remembered Dr Lee Siew Choh (who was one of those arrested): ‘And, almost immediately … General Election! You see, we were completely occupied with the trial!’

The Plebian, Barisan’s newsletter, called these elections ‘the most unfair and undemocratic in the history of Singapore’. The party again had trouble obtaining police permits for its rallies; on nomination day 17 potential Barisan candidates were held for questioning by Special Branch until it was too late for them to file their nomination papers (which then, as now, they had to do in person); three days earlier, three of the largest unions loyal to the Barisan had their bank accounts frozen to prevent their funds being used for political purposes. Finally, on the eve of the vote, Goh played on electoral anxieties once more by claiming that a Barisan victory would mean Malaysian troops in Singapore the following day.

[Singapore a biography, Mark Ravinder Frost and Yu-Mei Balasingamchow, page 408]

So, during the first 12 months of the PAP’s battle for merger the authorities revoked the license of the Barisan’s printer (meaning the party had to go out and buy its own press to publish campaign literature), denied it permits for mass rallies (or demanded they be held away from conspicuous central locations), and purged its supporters from the public sector. Singapore was not a place where you held down a government job while being known to have sympathies for the opposition …

[Singapore a biography, Mark Ravinder Frost and Yu-Mei Balasingamchow, page 399]

Evident also was Lee’s determination to move quickly to consolidate his position … Singapore’s own state elections were carefully staged on 21 September, their snap timing allowing only the barest minimum period (just over four days) for the opposition Barisan to conduct their campaign. They were additionally handicapped by the fact that many of their key leaders were still in detention following Cold Store, or preparing their cases before coming to trial, while the party had great problems securing sites for rallies, conducting canvassing and printing election literature in view of the tight restrictions imposed by the authorities. Most crucially the government dominated the mass media outlets, and with the inauguration of Malaysia taking place five days before polling, could campaign on the fulfillment of their earlier goal of bringing about ‘independence through merger’.

[Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia 1961-196, Matthew Jones, page 201]

For back in September 1961, the PAP had unleashed another crucial weapon in its struggle: the Prime Minister on Radio Singapore – or as the Barisan preferred to call it: ‘Radio PAP’.

[Singapore a biography, Mark Ravinder Frost and Yu-Mei Balasingamchow, page 400]

Barisan leaders were invited to join 12 subsequent radio forums to put their case across but refused. Lim and Woodhull demanded equal airtime to Lee for 12 talks of their own but were denied. In his memoirs, Lee wrote of when Puthucheary arrived in his office and asked for an autographed copy of the talks. Lee asked him if he would participate in the proposed forums. Puthucheary reportedly shook his head and said: ‘After you have set up the stage props, I would not stand a chance’.

[Singapore a biography, Mark Ravinder Frost and Yu-Mei Balasingamchow, page 401-402]

Rebutting Burhan Gafoor – Part 4

January 2, 2015

This is part 4 of the rebuttal to Singapore High Commissioner to Australia Mr Burhan Gafoor’s “Response to Poh Soo Kai’s allegations”.

Lee Kuan Yew’s Battle for Merger – stale, circumstantial, nothing definite

Mr Gafoor wrote:

Mr Lee Kuan Yew, in his Battle for Merger radio broadcasts in 1961, exposed the communists’ objective and strategy. He explained that the communists and the Barisan opposed merger because they wanted to establish control over Singapore so they could subsequently subvert and take over Malaya. The radio talks won over public opinion in favour of merger on the terms proposed by the Government.

However, this was what UK Deputy Commissioner to Singapore Philip Moore had to say about Lee Kuan Yew’s Battle for Merger:

But unless one was prepared to accept uncritically the evidence supplied by Lee Kuan Yew in his “Battle for Merger”, there was nothing very definite to go on apart from circumstantial evidence and stale security records.

[CO 1030/1160, P B C Moore to W I J Wallace, 7 Dec 1962]

Thus, UK Deputy Commissioner thought nothing about Lee Kuan Yew’s Battle for Merger. Mr Gafoor omitted this crucial piece of evidence from the UK Deputy Commissioner’s report while quoting profusely from other parts in the same paragraph. Thus, despite waxing lyrical about the need for holistic reading of all evidences and the inclusion of ‘incriminating’ evidence, it was Mr Gafoor who conveniently omitted evidences when they are in contradiction to what he had to say.

False referendum

Mr Gafoor wrote:

In the referendum in Sep 1962, the specific merger terms were put to the electorate. 71% of the voters opted for the PAP’s merger proposal while the Barisan, which called for blank votes to be cast in protest, got only 25%.

Mr Gafoor should realize that Singapore’s 1962 referendum was a false referendum that didn’t even allow for the people to vote “No” to merger as even blank votes were counted as “Yes”. How many of the 71% would have voted “No” if given the choice, no one will ever know. Even British Deputy Commissioner Philip Moore, someone whom Mr Gafoor is so fond of quoting from, felt that the PAP was being unscrupulous and undemocratic and that the referendum merely reflected PAP’s inability to get a genuine popular vote from the people.

When the referendum bill was introduced into the Singapore assembly in March 1962, the revelation that it gave voters only a choice between three different forms of merger, rather than including any option to reject merger completely, provoked yet more controversy, as did Lee’s announcement that blank ballots would be counted as votes in favour of the White Paper terms. British officials felt that the referendum was clearly being organized in an unscrupulous manner so that Lee could not lose.

Meanwhile, Lee’s referendum bill as finally forced through the Assembly, but its clause on blank ballots triggered the resignation of another PAP backbencher, finally depriving the Singapore Government of a majority …

By the middle of July 1962, Philip Moore, Selkirk’s deputy in Singapore, was reporting that ‘ … everyone realizes that the undemocratic features of the Bill are a reflection of the Government’s inability to get a genuine popular vote in favour of its White Paper proposals’. Only the rapid progress in the formation of Malaysia, it was becoming more and more apparent, would give PAP its crucial safety net.

[Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia 1961-196, Matthew Jones, page 78]

Mr Gafoor wrote:

There were trade-offs in the negotiations with Malaya for merger, as in any negotiation between states and territories. The terms and conditions settled upon were the best that the Singapore government could obtain under the circumstances. They allowed Singapore to retain control over areas that were key to Singaporeans such as education and labour.

Unlike what Mr Gafoor said, the terms and conditions for merger were hardly in the best interests of Singapore. Not only would Singapore have been under represented in the federal assembly, we also had to pay dearly for the merger.

The terms had immediately sparked controversy in that by allocating Singapore 15 seats out of 159 in the new projected federal assembly, they did not provide for proportionate representation. They also described all 624,000 Singapore citizens as becoming ‘nationals’ of the new Malaysian federation, leaving ambiguity over whether they would be accorded the same rights (including voting powers) as other ‘federal’ citizens; a residence requirement and Malay language test would be needed before many of the foreign-born Chinese in Singapore could be classed as full Malaysian citizens.

[Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia 1961-196, Matthew Jones, page 77]

Singapore agreed that 40 per cent of its income revenue would go towards Pan-Malaysia expenditures, subject to periodic review. Furthermore, Singapore would provide a loan of $150 million to the Borneo territories on very generous terms …

[Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia 1961-196, Matthew Jones, page 165]

Mr Gafoor should also note that the merger was essentially a swap of British overlordship for Malaysian overlordship with no improvement whatsoever to Singapore’s independence.

No armed struggle by Barisan

Mr Gafoor wrote:

The issue of armed struggle was discussed at length at a Barisan HQ meeting attended by about 40 cadres, including members of the Central Executive Committee as well as branch representatives, on 23 Sep 1962. Summing up the views expressed, Barisan Central Executive Committee member Chok Kok Thong urged his colleagues to “themselves determine the form their struggle should take: ‘basically armed struggle is the highest form of struggle’ but whether it should be adopted or not would depend on ‘the entire international situation’…”. Chok Kok Thong added:“…no one could say that the revolution was complete if it took the form of an armed struggle or incomplete if the peaceful and constitutional methods were used. …Experience elsewhere showed that there was no country in the world which had ‘attained a thorough success in revolution through constitutional processes’, and that throughout South East Asia, including Malaya, the ‘ruling classes would not lightly hand over political power to the leftists’”.

[Mr Gafoor’s reference: CO 1030/1160, Report on Barisan Sosialis meeting of 23 Sep 1962]

Mr Gafoor omitted the following evidences provided by Dr Thum Pin Tjin in his Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 211 – The Fundamental Issue is Anti-colonialism, Not Merger’: Singapore’s “Progressive Left”, Operation Coldstore, and the Creation of Malaysia:

Lim urged his colleagues to recognize that their political struggle was ‘a longer term struggle,’ and ‘we can only beat the current government when the general election comes.’

[林清祥与他的时代, page 145-146]

The party agreed that their only option was to keep using peaceful constitutional processes with the aim of winning elections to the Federal parliament and building a multiracial progressive coalition.

[CO 1030/1160, Report on Barisan Sosialis meeting of 30 Sept 1962]

Thus, Mr Gafoor only referred to the ‘incriminating’ Barisan meeting of 23 Sept 1962 found in UK Deputy Commissioner’s report but did not refer to the exculpatory Barisan meeting the following week on 30 Sept 1962 in the same report. It is Mr Gafoor himself who was guilty of the selective quoting that he complained about. Chok Kok Thong’s ‘incriminating’ words on 23 Sept 1962 should have been more than exculpated by Lim Chin Siong’s words on 30 Sept 1962.

Mr Gafoor wrote:

The Barisan’s support for the armed Brunei revolt in Dec 1962, and their close association with the rebel leaders, showed that they were ready, when the opportunity arose, to use violent unconstitutional means to overthrow the government.

The Internal Security Council of Singapore (ISC), comprising representatives of the governments of the United Kingdom, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, therefore approved Operation Coldstore in Feb 1963, as a pre-emptive move against the communists and their supporters.

Mr Gafoor omitted the story that followed which was the failure of the British and the PAP to find incriminating evidence of Barisan involvement in the Brunei revolt. In other words, Operation Cold Store was sanctioned on the premise of false charges.

Operation Cold Store detained 113 left-wing political leaders and trade unionists, including Lim. Subsequent British investigations found little evidence of Barisan involvement in the Brunei plot, but the detentions decimated the left.

[Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-war Singapore, Michael D. Barr, Carl A. Trock]

Two months after the arrests, however, Sellkirk was disappointed that no new evidence was forthcoming on the connection between the Barisan and the Brunei Revolt, with the only “embarrassing” new point suggesting that the party had been resisting Azahari’s overtures to give more militant support to the rebels. What emerges from these various sources is a solidifying picture of difficult but ultimately unsatisfactory agreements on the arrests …

[The University Socialist Club and the Contest for Malaya: Tangled Strands of Modernity, Edgar Liao and Cheng Tju Lim and Guo Quan Seng, page 198]

Immediately following the arrests, the Internal Security Council announced that Special Branch had uncovered a plot to make Singapore a ‘Communist Cuba’ – full details would follow. But despite weeks of interrogations, strong evidence to substantiate this claim failed to materialise. Toh Chin Chye later described the political detainees who remained in prison after 1959 as ‘a sacrifice to Merger’ …

[Singapore A Biography, Mark Ravinder Frost and Yu-Mei Balasinghamchow, page 406]

Part 1 of this rebuttal has already explained that Operation Cold Store was already a done deal between Lee Kuan Yew, the Tunku and the British long before the ‘incriminating’ Barisan meeting of 23 Sept 1962 and the Dec 1962 Brunei revolt which were merely pretexts to make Operation Cold Store look good for the three co-conspirators.

Rebutting Burhan Gafoor – Part 3

December 31, 2014

This is part 3 of the rebuttal to Singapore High Commissioner to Australia Mr Burhan Gafoor’s “Response to Poh Soo Kai’s allegations”.

No about turn by Singapore Leftists

Mr Gafoor wrote:

But when the Tunku offered merger through Malaysia in May 1961, the communists made a startling about-turn. They determined to derail merger, even though they had all along insisted that Malaya and Singapore were one entity.

[Mr Gafoor’s reference: Chin Peng: My Side of History, page 437]

Mr Gafoor only had to flip one more page to understand the so-called ‘startling about turn’. Chin Peng explained on page 438:

Singapore, we maintained, would be entering Malaysia on terms that would be unequal to the other territories. Malaya’s legislation, we said, strongly favoured the Malays to the disadvantage of the Chinese and this situation would remain in force within the new Malaysian concept. We knew the Chinese of Singapore would be deeply worried by the prospects for education in general and Chinese schools in particular under a Malaysia controlled from Kuala Lumpur.

Thus, the anti-merger group (including Barisan, David Marshall and others) weren’t doing an about turn but merely expressing concern that Lee Kuan Yew was pushing Singapore to join Malaysia on unequal terms. History has validated the anti-merger stance with the communal riots that led to Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia.

Alignment isn’t conformance

Mr Gafoor wrote:

Chin Peng later made it clear that the CPM wished to sabotage merger or delay its implementation at that stage. He disclosed that “(The) three of us (Chin Peng, Siao Chang and Eu Chooi Yip) came to the conclusion that it would be in the best interest of our Party (italics inserted for emphasis) if we plotted to sabotage (merger). If we couldn’t derail it, at least we might substantially delay its implementation”. The Barisan conformed to the CPM line and mounted a strong challenge to the PAP on merger.

[Mr Gafoor’s reference: Chin Peng: My Side of History, page 437]

Mr Gafoor should not mistake the common stance taken by the Barisan and the CPM on the merger issue as evidence of Barisan conforming to the CPM line. At that time, David Marshall also stood with Barisan against merger. Going by Mr Gafoor’s logic, would it be Barisan conforming to David Marshall’s line or David Marshall conforming to Barisan’s line?

In addition to the Barisan, David Marshall and a number of others led a campaign against Singapore joining the Federation on the proposed terms.

[Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control, Carl A. Trocki, page 111]

After they lost the debate on Singapore’s referendum bill in July 1962, a group of Assemblymen led by the Barisan Socialis and David Marshall sent an appeal to the United Nations.

[Looking East to Look West: Lee Kuan Yew’s Mission India, Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, page 89]

David Marshall, leader of the Workers’ Party, was opposed to the citizenship provision, and argued that he would continue his opposition to merger unless “the Tunku [was] prepared to agree either to a common citizenship for Malaysia with the right to vote limited to the state in which the citizen was living, or that any alteration …

[Creating “Greater Malaysia”: Decolonization and the Politics of Merger, Tan Tai Yong, page 94]

Even till this day, opposition parties often adopt the same or similar positions on various issues but that doesn’t imply that one opposition party is toeing the line of another opposition party or vice versa.

Anti-British League not necessarily communist

Mr Gafoor wrote:

At least seven of the Barisan’s 16 central committee members were known CPM or former Anti-British League (ABL) members. (The ABL was a CPM underground political organisation set up in 1948 and disbanded in 1957.)

Mr Gafoor should take note that Anti-British League members weren’t necessarily communists as most were free radicals or anti-colonialists.

The first thing to realise is that although left-wing and anti-colonial radicalism flourished to unprecedented levels during the first half of the 1950s, the Communist Party itself was diminishing as a controlling force in Singapore over the same period. The Party machinery was almost completely smashed by the colonial security forces in 1948, and although the surviving operations – most notably the Anti-British League – were notionally answerable to the party, their members and activists were mostly free radicals, swept up in a surge of anti-colonialism. Many were not communists at all and some were much more militant than the Party.

[Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-building Project, Michael D. Barr and Zlatko Skrbiš, page 26]

While there is no doubt that Lim Chin Siong, being an ex-Anti-British League member, was ideologically close to the MCP, there has been to date no conclusive proof to indicate that four years after ceasing contact with his direct superior in the ABL, Lim had not evolved into a nationalist socialist leader in his own right. It was in this new, semi-autonomous political role that Lim, as recently revealed in this history of the PAP, Men in White (2009), met Fong three times between the late 1950s and early 1961. It remains difficult to assess the full impact of the MCP on left-wing politics in Singapore until the full content of these meetings is made known.

[The University Socialist Club and the Contest for Malaya: Tangled Strands of Modernity, Edgar Liao and Lim Cheng Tju and Seng Guo Quan, page 169]

What’s wrong with Fong Chong Pik using the Chinese press?

Mr Gafoor wrote:

On his part, the Plen frankly revealed that he had used the Chinese press to try to delay merger. He wrote: “A lot of the opinions expressed in the newspapers originated from me. “These included slowing down the process of merger, and adopting the form of a confederation.”

[Mr Gafoor’s reference: Fong Chong Pik: The Memoirs of a Malayan Communist Revolutionary, page 161]

He was also behind the agitation against educational reform in the Chinese middle schools, resulting in the examination boycott of November 1961. His aim was to arouse public dissatisfaction with the Government in the run-up to the merger referendum.

Mr Gafoor’s reference, reproduced below, shows Fong Chong Pik explaining that he used the Chinese press to delay merger because he felt merger was too hastily prepared and could have caused racial conflict and because it was the only way he could counter slanders against him and his party:

Question: … Do you have anything you wish to say about the period when you went underground in 1951, to the emergence of the Singapore Malaya merger plan in 1963?

Answer: To discuss the past history after several decades may seem like wise after the event. But I felt that some of the actions of Lee Kuan Yew, particularly his haste in pushing through the merger, were mainly aimed at making use of the Malaysian government to suppress the left-wing and consolidate his rule of Singapore. If the left-wing did indeed cause a popular uprising, suppression was quite possible.
Secondly, knowing that the British could easily raise racial issues with the Tunku, I was worried that if the Malaysian government began to suppress the left-wing in Singapore, and the left-wing fought back causing a racial conflict, I would no longer be just political suppression. The wound and pain resulting from such conflict would require several generations to heal. Because of these worries, I did not agree to the merger.
Thirdly, at the time, the rumour in Singapore was that they were intent on obtaining the leadership in Malaysia following merger. They slandered the communists, accusing them of attempting to use Singapore as a base to subvert Malaysia. But we, the communists, could not step out and challenge this to defend ourselves. A lot of the opinions expressed in the newspapers originated from me. These included slowing down the process of merger, and adopting the form of a confederation. It was not all as they said, that the left-wing was opposed to merger because we were afraid of suppression by the Malaysian government.

The Singapore newspaper, Lianhe Zaobao, reprinted the Nanyang Siang Pau interview. Later, on August 4, 1997, Lianhe Zaobao carried a letter to the editor written by Madame Yang Yoon Ying, Lee Kuan Yew’s press secretary, commenting on my interview. Assuming that Madame Yang’s view had originated from Mr. Lee, it was most interesting that her first paragraph should deal with none other than the “merger” issue.


Mr. Fong Chong Pik said that he agreed with the merger, but his words are inconsistent with his actions in the 1960s. He was strongly opposed to merger, and ordered the later Lim Chin Siong to split the PAP to stop the merger. It shows that the material evidence and witness to what had happened are still present.

Obviously, these comments were not aimed at promoting a discussion on the historical evidence of “merger”, whether “merger” was a success or failure, right or wrong. But the thrust was to twist the issue by accusing me of being inconsistent.

I wrote a reply to Madame Yang through Lianhe Zaobao. On September 7, 1997, Lianhe Zaobao published my reply. On the “merger” issue, I had this to say:


First your comments accused me of being inconsistent. This is not in conformity with the facts. Indeed, it is twisting the facts.

In the Nanyang Siang Pau interview, I clearly said: ‘Because of these worries, I did not agree to the merger.’ I did not contradict myself. Where is the inconsistency?

In addition, it needs to be pointed out that those people who stand for ‘unification between Singapore and Malaya’ do not have to accept any unsuitable ‘merger arrangement’. The hungry will search for food, but do not have to ingest poison to satisfy hunger. Where is the inconsistency?

I said in the Nanyang Siang Pau interview, ‘That the 1963 merger was short and temporary demonstrates that the conditions for merger were not ripe.’ Is this not a fact?

My interview was reprinted in the Lianhe Zaobao. Had Madame Yang not read it?

[Fong Chong Pik: The Memoirs of a Malayan Communist Revolutionary, page 160-162]

Mr Gafoor did not provide any reference to Fong Chong Pik’s supposed agitation against educational reform in the Chinese middle schools. In any case, historians have explained why these educational reforms were such a big concern to the Chinese community then that no communist agitation was required for these societal issues to explode into political hot potatoes.

The second issue was the conversion of Chinese middle school structure into an English-medium, multi-ethnic school system and the repeated denial of full government support for the newly established Chinese-medium Nanyang University. When the battle over educational reforms fused with the 1961 internal party split within the PAP …, the campuses of these four tertiary institutions were rocked with protests. Students from these institutions often banded together to launch manifestos, classroom boycotts, hunger strikes and street marches so as to protest against government raids, arrests, expulsions … The post-independence period from 1965 was similarly turbulent as the PAP was determined to follow through with its educational reforms by using the Wang Gungwu Report on Nanyang University … In October and November 1966, hundreds of students again had another serious clash with the police at the Ministry of Education

[The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and Its Pasts, Lysa Hong and Huang Jianli, page 138]

… in another major student protest, the examination strike of 1961, which was also sparked by the government’s initiative to change the Chinese school system. The examination strikes that took place in 1961 were prompted by changes made to the Chinese school system. Traditionally, the Chinese middle schools followed the so-called “3-3 system” … Lim Yew Hock’s … government announced that … Chinese middle school system would be changed to a four-year system in line with the English school system … this new system was opposed by Chinese educators. One major concern was that Chinese schools would disappear … There were also worries that students who failed the Middle Four examinations would lose two years of education … When the PAP took over … in 1959 … the new government planned to go ahead with the change from the “3-3 system” to the “4-2″ system.” … the new government also announced that, starting in 1962, all students in the Middle Four classes would have to take a general school-leaving examination set by the government before they would be allowed to go on to the next level (pre-university). The implementation of the new policy caused conflict between the PAP government and the Chinese educators and eventually led to the examination strikes by the Chinese students.

[Singapore Chinese Society in Transition: Business, Politics, & Socio-Economic Change, 1945-1965, Liu Hong, page 153]

Rebutting Burhan Gafoor – Part 2

December 29, 2014

This is part 2 of the rebuttal to Singapore High Commissioner to Australia Mr Burhan Gafoor’s “Response to Poh Soo Kai’s allegations”.

Communist influence doesn’t imply communist infiltration

Mr Gafoor wrote:

Chin Peng has confirmed that the Barisan was under the CPM’s influence. He cagily disagreed that the CPM “controlled” the Barisan, but admitted: “We certainly influenced them.” He did not elaborate on how the CPM “influenced” the Barisan or who were the CPM’s proxies in its central executive committee, but he confirmed that communists were among those who joined the party.

[Mr Gafoor’s reference: Chin Peng: My Side of History, page 438]

Mr Gafoor was referring to this paragraph from Chin Peng’s memoirs:

Contrary to the countless allegations made over the years by Singapore leaders, academics and the Western press, we never controlled the Barisan Sosialis. We certainly influenced them. But neither Dr Lee Siew Chor, the Party Chief nor, as I understand it, other prominent opposition figures like the Puthucheary brothers – James and Dominic – had ever been CPM members. Nor had we ever been able to control them. Unquestionably we tried, as we did with many other aspiring politicians of the time.

Thus, contrary to what Mr Gafoor said, Chin Peng wasn’t cagey but clear and definitive when he stated that the CPM did not control Barisan.

Mr Gafoor was wrong to assume that CPM’s influence on Barisan meant there were commnuists in the Barisan or there were CPM proxies in the Barisan central executive committee. Lee Kuan Yew had been influenced by Alex Josey, Jawaharlal Nehru and Professor H.J. Eysenck even though none of them were ever PAP members or in the PAP central executive committee.

I do not know why he did that. But he was influenced by Alex Josey, who came from the Middle East where he had been a reporter. Josey fed him ideas about the Muslims. The “Mad Mullahs.” The “Ultras.” Lee used the term, “Mad Mullahs.” This was Alex Josey’s phrase. Alex Josey was his close friend, golfing friend and biographer.

[Dr Toh Chin Chye referring to Lee Kuan Yew being influenced by Alex Josey during an interview published in ‘Leaders of Singapore’ by Melanie Chew in 1996]

In the early years of his political career, Lee was profoundly influenced by Jawaharlal Nehru.

[http://www.thehindu.com/books/insights-into-indiasingapore-relations/article223010.ece]

Lee Kuan Yew believes in eugenics. Among others, he has been influenced by Professor H.J. Eysenck, an expert on measuring intelligence who visited Singapore in 1987.

[http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2009/01/behavioral_genetics_in_singapore.html]

On the contrary, Chin Peng stated categorically that prominent opposition figures like Dr Lee Siew Chor and the Puthucheary brothers were never CPM members and that tried as they did, they could not control the great many aspiring politicians then.

If CPM could not control the great many aspiring politicians then, how could those aspiring politicians have been communists? In fact, why would CPM need to try so hard to control the many aspiring politicians then if they were already communists?

The CPM’s inability to control the great many politicians then suggests instead that CPM’s influence was limited. Many historians support the notion that Barisan was neither communist nor communist controlled:

‘the MCP did not exercise the control over its fellow-travelers that it sought’, ‘the very idea of a “Communist United Front” is perhaps a misnomer’ as ‘most of the groups caught up in leftist popular radicalism … were neither communist, united, nor a front for anybody but themselves’ and the equating of disorder on the peninsula as a “Communist plot’ was ultimately made only as ‘a leap of faith’.

Harper … concluded that ‘hard evidence is hard to find’ about Singapore left’s complicity with the Communist underground. While some colonial officials had strong reservations, others made the leap based merely on circumstantial evidence. The failed MCP armed uprising, its retreat into deep jungle bases, the demise of the Anti-British League, and the work of colonial intelligence, infiltrators and agents provocateurs meant that ‘the MCP’s influence on the radical politics of Singapore in the late 1950s and early 1960s was, if anything, weaker than it had been between 1945 and 1951′.

Harper devoted considerable attention to ‘authoritative new archival research’ which suggested that Lee had been manoeuvring intensely to wield detention power from behind the scene and letting the British and Kuala Lumpur authorities take the blame for the suppression. British officials, including William Goode, Philip Moore and Lord Selkirk, had expressed strong reservations about Lee’s approach. The United Kingdom Commission in Singapore had even ‘attempted to stall and block these arrests’. Lord Selkirk had warned his superior that ‘Tunku’s and Lee’s respective bids for 25 and 250 arrests in July 1962′ were moves against their political opposition for which the British were to take the blame. Most strikingly, Selkirk assessed that Lee was ‘probably very much attracted to the idea of destroying his political opponents. It should be remembered that there is behind all this a very personal aspect … he claims he wishes to put back in detention the very people … with whom there is strong sense of political rivalry which transcends ideological differences’. However, such internal British reservations were rendered redundant by the momentum of decolonisation and the larger considerations of the Whitehall and British officials in the Federation of Malaya, as well as by Tunku’s pressure. Operation Cold Store was eventually launched on 2 February 1963, but subsequent British internal assessment had to admit that ‘the interrogations have so far produced little new evidence about the Communist conspiracy’.

[The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and Its Pasts, Lysa Hong and Huang Jianli, page 148]

In spite of intensive investigations, no evidence has been obtained of C.P.M. directions to open United Front workers as to how they should carry out their activities.

As the scope of the United Front widens to include a major element of the trade unions, as well as peasant and student organisations, it must become increasingly difficult, if not impossible for a secret caucus of Party members (assuming that such exists) to control all its ramifications and direct all its activities.

If they were indeed doing this successfully, it is inconceivable that Special Branch investigations would have failed to yield any evidence of such control and direction.

It is far more likely (as was envisaged by the Party themselves in the October Resolutions of 1951) that the “United Front” represents an amalgam of different and conflicting interests, individual ambitions, industrial grievances, Chinese nationalism, housing problems of the peasant population and educational frustration of the students.

At present they are united only in their dissatisfactions with the P.A.P. Government, and they cannot be considered to form a monolithic Communist edifice under strict Party management

[http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2013/12/united-front-were-no-communists-british-intelligence/]

… it is important to note that even though some Leftist members of the CEC were associate with the MCP, their actions were not directed by the Party. Their aggressive push for power grew from local frustrations and not from any sort of strategic planning or instructions … it seems that even at this senior level, the Party was unable to keep control of events … since 1956, the MCP had considered the Singapore operations as a whole to be overly ‘left’ and too militant and had criticised the 13 May 1954 riot and the May 1955 Hock Lee Bus riot as overly ‘left’. A directive … reached Singapore in late 1956 urging moderation, but the political situation in Singapore was moving faster than the courier communication system. Isolated directives arriving months after the events … had little impact on the ground

[Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-war Singapore, Michael D. Barr and Carl A. Trocki, page 65]

Rebutting Burhan Gafoor – Part 1 (Selkirk & Moore)

December 23, 2014

I refer to excerpts from the 19 Dec 2014 Straits Times column “A ferocious struggle for Singapore’s future” by Singapore’s High Commissioner to Australia Mr Burhan Gafoor.

Dr Thum did not omit mention of ‘incriminating’ information

Contrary to Mr Gafoor’s claims, Dr Thum Ping Tjin did not conveniently omit mention of ‘incriminating’ information from British National Archives. Dr Thum referred to the same ‘incriminating’ information that Mr Gafoor referred to when he specifically wrote in his Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 211 – The Fundamental Issue is Anti-colonialism, Not Merger’: Singapore’s “Progressive Left”, Operation Coldstore, and the Creation of Malaysia:

Selkirk spent the bulk of his four-page telegram to Sandys explaining that it was now impossible to deny the Federation the arrests they so badly craved without jeopardising merger. In six lines, Selkirk added that recent intelligence demonstrated communist control of the Barisan, and that Lim had never explicitly ruled out violent action.

The evidence which Selkirk cited was accounts of two post-referendum Barisan meetings. Barisan members had complained that the constitution was pointless if it was so easily manipulated, asking if there was another way forward. Selkirk chose to interpret these as calls to abandon constitutional action, and disregarded their unanimous agreement to keep following peaceful constitutional action. Selkirk’s assertion that Lim never ruled out violent action was based on Lim’s statement that ‘so long as the conditions for peaceful constitutional struggle remain available to us, we will persist in the peaceful constitutional method of struggle,’ …

Thus, Dr Thum not only referred to the same ‘incriminating’ information, he also explained why Selkirk had been wrong on that occasion.

Mr Gafor omitted mention of pressure from the Malayan government for the arrests

Mr Gafor’s so-called holistic reading of declassified documents isn’t so holistic after all. He omitted to mention the Malayan Government’s pressing for the arrest of Singapore Leftists as a pre-condition for merger. The British had in fact already agreed to the arrests prior to Singapore’s merger referendum on 1 Sept 1962 and certainly prior to Mr Gafor’s so-called incriminating information about Barisan’s post referendum meetings.

… the Tunku’s wish to see an arrest programme carried out before merger, and Lee Kuan Yew’s desire for concessions over the status of Singapore citizens within Malaysia if his referendum campaign were to receive a much needed boost … The possibility of linking the various issues had, in fact, already been raised by Selkirk with the Prime Minister in mid-May 1962, where the former had mentioned that to secure agreement on the practical aspects of Malaysia, ‘we might have to be prepared to exercise some pressure’ … The Tunku might indeed offer to accept the Cobbold report if he were allowed to lock up all the extremist opposition in Singapore. Lord Selkirk hoped that this bargain would not be put to us as it woud be a difficult one. The outlines of a deal were already apparent: if the British could satisfy the Tunku with an ISC-sanctioned arrest programme before merger then the Tunku might be prepared to be more forthcoming over the terms of federation with the Borneo territories.

That Singapore questions would assume great importance during the London talks was shown by the preliminary meetings held at Admiralty House between the Tunku and Macmillan immediately after the former’s arrival on 17 Jul 1962. As had been anticipated, the Tunku began by pressing the British to ‘clean up’ the Communists in the colony before the new federation was formed, arguing that, ‘In order to get a good result in the referendum [Lee Kuan Yew] needed a good press and the suppression of the communists.

… Putting forward their own requirements on 18 July, the Malayans called for unanimity on the ISC over plans to detain Communists and their sympathizers (starting with 25 members of the Barisan) after the Singapore referendum, but before merger …

… with the British needing every bargaining instrument that they could find to move the talks forward, it began to look increasingly likely that acquiescence in a round-up of the opposition in Singapore would be forthcoming.

Strenuous opposition to any such concession came from the local British officials who would have to implement such a measure, Philip Moore maintaining, ‘It seems to us plain foolishness to decide upon repressive action in Singapore. Doubting that the leading figures in the Barisan were actually engaged in subversion or were the ‘compliant tool of Peking or Moscow’, Moore wanted to ‘stress again that in Singapore today we have a political and not a security problem. We know who most of the portential subversives are and they could easily be gathered in at any time they seemed to threaten the security of the state.’ Moore’s main concern was that ‘to arrest leading members of the main Opposition party without adequate cause’ would merely help to intensify anti-Malaysia feeling and unite opponents of the PAP. In a similar fashion, Selkirk informed Sandys on 27 July that an arrest programme would be a dangerous move and was only likely to provoke more trouble …de Zulueta reported … the British offering to go ahead with the Singapore arrests in order to clinch the whole deal.

… In an oblique reference, Macmillan was also recorded as saying, “It would also be helpful if the question of dangerous Communists in Singapore would be deferred until after the [UK] Parliamentary discussions. The meaning of this remark was soon to become apparent.

… With Lee then putting forward proposals for a post-referendum arrest programme, Sandys duly indicated that previous British resistance on the ISC to such action would be lifted, though … he carefully phrased his comments to suggest that … individual cases would need to be considered on their merits.

The agreement made by the Tunku in London over the citizenship question, for which the British had assented to an arrest programme, paved the way for the staging of the referendum on merger in Singapore.

[Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia 1961-1965, Matthew Jones, page 89-93]

Thus, Operation Coldstore was already a done deal between the British, the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew even before Mr Gafor’s so-called incriminating Barisan meeting. The so-called incriminating Barisan meeting wasn’t the raison d’état for Operation Coldstore although it could have served a pretext purpose.

Mr Gafor failed to explain significance of Brunei revolt

As ‘incriminating’ as Barisan’s September 1962 meetings had been, the British and the PAP didn’t make a move to launch Operation Coldstore but waited instead for a better pretext to surface. That better pretext appeared in the form of the Brunei revolt in December 1962 which Mr Gafor briefly mentioned but did not explain its significance. The inability of the British and the PAP to launch Operation Coldstore on the premise of the ‘incriminating’ Barisan meetings of September 1962 shows just how ‘incriminating’ or not they are.

Moreover, Lord Selkirk would eventually be disappointed that subsequent interrogations yielded little credible evidence of Barisan involvement in the Brunei revolt. In other words, the pretext for Operation Coldstore had been false.

The Brunei revolt was also regarded by Lee Kuan Yew, and by the Malayan Government, as convenient cover for the implementation of the arrest programme in Singapore that had been devised by Special Branch officers in the spring of 1962, and discussed with British ministers during the London talks in July. Events in Brunei had done little to inspire Malayan confidence in British willingness to act decisively to forestall an imminent threat, but they now expected measures to be taken against the political opposition in Singapore. When it became clear that Azahari had met with Lim Chin Siong, the Barisan chairman, in Singapore just prior to the revolt on 3 December, Lee considered it a ‘heaven-sent’ opportunity of justifying action’. Nevertheless, the key local officials on the British side, Selkirk and Moore, were deeply reluctant to authorize any large-scale round-up of Barisan leaders and other alleged subversives, despite the tacit understanding previously reached by the Tunku, Lee and Sandys in London.

The Malayan Government had by now come to regard an arrest programme as an essential pre-condition for merger with Singapore, hoping that responsibility for unpopular and tough measures would be taken by Lee and the British rather than themselves once Malaysia was formed. With the Singapore Special Branch able to present new evidence of Communist penetration and control of the Barisan, combined with the alarming events in Brunei, Selkirk faced heavy pressure to drop his previous resistance on the ISC to carrying out arrests. In a telegram of 12 December given personal approval by the Prime Minister, Sandys informed Selkirk: ‘As you know I have all along been reluctant to give blanket approval in advance for arrests of subversive elements in Singapore. But if we are to avoid a dangerous disagreement with the Malayan Government we shall have to take some action of this kind before merger.’ Sandys felt that ‘we should move at once’ with the Brunei revolt providing the ‘best possible background against which to take this action’. The following day the ISC met, and with Selkirk’s agreement given the new evidence produced on the links between Azahari and the Barisan leaders, decided on a series of arrests to begin on 16 December. However, the operation collapsed at the very last minute, when Lee Kuan Yew added several names to the arrest list (including those of anti-Malaysia members of the Malayan Federal Assembly in Kuala Lumpur) prompting the Federation’s representative on the ISC to withdraw amid protests and recriminations.

Another meeting of the ISC was scheduled for 1 February 1963, and frantic efforts were made by the British to remount Operation Cold Store, as the arrest programme was dubbed. Despite Selkirk’s fresh reservations over the names that now appeared on the lists agreed to by Lee and Federation ministers, Sandys issued a terse instruction to the British Commissioner that there was no alternative but to accept majority opinion on the ISC and vote for a unanimous decision. Selkirk acquiesced, and on 2 February, 111 suspects in Singapore and Malaya (including 24 members of the Barisan) were taken into detention.

[Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia 1961-1965, Matthew Jones, page 117]

Operation Cold Store detained 113 left-wing political leaders and trade unionists, including Lim. Subsequent British investigations found little evidence of Barisan involvement in the Brunei plot, but the detentions decimated the left.

[Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-war Singapore, Michael D. Barr, Carl A. Trock]

Two months after the arrests, however, Sellkirk was disappointed that no new evidence was forthcoming on the connection between the Barisan and the Brunei Revolt, with the only “embarrassing” new point suggesting that the party had been resisting Azahari’s overtures to give more militant support to the rebels. What emerges from these various sources is a solidifying picture of difficult but ultimately unsatisfactory agreements on the arrests …

[The University Socialist Club and the Contest for Malaya: Tangled Strands of Modernity, Edgar Liao and Cheng Tju Lim and Guo Quan Seng, page 198]

On 8 December 1962, a leftist rebellion by the self-proclaimed North Borneo National Army broke out in Brunei; two days before, Lim (Chin Siong) had had lunch in the restaurant of Singapore’s aptly named Rendezvous Hotel with Sheik A. M. Azahari, the leading Bunei leftist susequently accused of masterminding the revolt.

It was enough to satisfy the British; yet such was the continued wrangling on the Internal Security Council that it took nearly two months – during which an initial launch of the operation planned for 16 December had to be aborted the night before – for all parties to commit to action. Immediately following the arrests, the Internal Security Council announced that Special Branch had uncovered a plot to make Singapore a ‘Communist Cuba’ – full details would follow. But despite weeks of interrogations, strong evidence to substantiate this claim failed to materialise. Toh Chin Chye later described the political detainees who remained in prison after 1959 as ‘a sacrifice to Merger’ …

[Singapore A Biography, Mark Ravinder Frost and Yu-Mei Balasinghamchow, page 406]

Tunku believed Lee Kuan Yew used Operation Coldstore to eliminate opposition

Such was the lack of a clear conscionable purpose that even the Tunku believed that Operation Coldstore was being used by Lee Kuan Yew to get rid of opposition in parliament.

‘Operation Coldstore’, as it was called, had been planned for some time. But for months before it commenced, the Internal security Council, on which the Malayan government was represented along with Britain and Singapore, argued over the extent of the arrests and their timing. Memoirs and top-secret diplomatic correspondence reveal the mutual suspicions that hung over these meetings. The Tungku believed Singapore’s Prime Minister wanted to use the operation to remove his entire parliamentary opposition; Lee was wary of the Tunku not taking equal responsibility for the arrests; meanwhile the British wanted the left-wing movement in Singapore smashed but, so as to give their actions at least a semblance of ‘fair play’, they awaited some clear pretext for doing so.

[Singapore A Biography, Mark Ravinder Frost and Yu-Mei Balasinghamchow, page 405-406]

Declassified documents dismiss Lee Kuan Yew’s ‘Battle for Merger’

Mr Gafor also failed to mention that the same declassified document that he quoted from also revealed Deputy UK Commissioner to Singapore Philip Moore dismissing Lee Kuan Yew’s ‘Batte for Merger’ as circumstantial, stale and nothing very definite:

But unless one was prepared to accept uncritically the evidence supplied by Lee Kuan Yew in his “Battle for Merger”, there was nothing very definite to go on apart from circumstantial evidence and stale security records.

Conclusion

Mr Gafor’s fervent accusations of Dr Thum Ping Tjin and others have backfired on himself. It turns out that it is Mr Gafor himself who hasn’t read declassified information holistically and who has omitted critical pieces of information.

A more holistic reading of declassified materials than the one by Mr Gafor will reveal that Operation Coldstore was a political, not a security decision proposed by Lee Kuan Yew, insisted by the Tunku and agreed by the British even before Mr Gafor’s so-called ‘incriminating’ information about communist penetration into Barisan. Communist penetration into Barisan, even if it had been true, was at best a pretext and not the reason for Operation Coldstore.

Straits Times, Excerpts from “A ferocious struggle for Singapore’s future”, 19 Dec 2014

This is a response from High Commissioner to Australia Burhan Gafoor to an article by former Barisan Sosialis assistant secretary-general Poh Soo Kai.

BY BURHAN GAFOOR, SINGAPORE HIGH COMMISSIONER TO AUSTRALIA

Dr Poh and other revisionists like Dr Thum Ping Tjin have alleged that Operation Coldstore was a political exercise meant to suppress what they claim to be legitimate, presumably peaceful, democratic opponents of the PAP government. A full reading of the declassified documents from the British National Archives shows clearly that Operation Coldstore was a security operation meant to counter the serious security threat posed by the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and their supporters in Singapore, working through the Barisan and associated communist united front (CUF) organisations. The revisionists conveniently omit mention of the incriminating information in these documents. For example, they quote selectively some of then UK Commissioner to Singapore Lord Selkirk’s remarks to claim that Operation Coldstore was an act of political suppression with no security basis. But a holistic reading of all the documents debunks their accounts. The documents reveal that both Lord Selkirk and his deputy Philip Moore were concerned about the extent to which the CPM had penetrated the Barisan and had concluded that security action was imperative. Indeed, about two months before Operation Coldstore was carried out, they had begun to urge strenuously that action be taken.

The UK Deputy Commissioner in Singapore at that time, Philip Moore, made a perceptive observation that would apply to those who now feign ignorance or deny knowledge of communist control and influence over the Barisan and other CUF organisations. Reporting to London in December 1962, Moore noted that “knowing what we now do about the extent of Communist penetration within Barisan Sosialis, it will be more difficult to acquit many of the other leading members as unwitting dupes”.

Moore was referring to two reports of meetings at Barisan HQ that he described as “of considerable importance not only for what they reveal of the future intentions of Barisan Sosialis, but they provide more conclusive evidence than we have had hitherto for the belief that Barisan Sosialis are Communist-controlled”.

“It has never been disputed,” he notes, “that the Communists in Singapore are following United Front tactics and that Barisan Sosialis is their principal instrument on the political front… The report on the first of the two (Barisan) meetings shows that those engaging in the discussion were Communists examining quite frankly how best to achieve their ends. Furthermore, we can see that the Communist influence within Barisan Sosialis is not confined to the Central Executive Committee but extends to Branch Committee level…”.

Moore’s superior, Lord Selkirk, concurred with this judgment. A week later, on Dec 14, 1962, after the Brunei rebellion, Lord Selkirk sent a dispatch stating: “I said I had recognised all along that a threat was presented by the communists in Singapore. I had not however previously been convinced that a large number of arrests were necessary to counter this threat. Recently, however, new evidence had been produced about the extent of the communist control of the Barisan Sosialis and also there had been indications that the communists might resort to violence if the opportunity occurred. Recent statements by the Barisan Sosialis and Party Rakyat supporting the revolt in Brunei confirmed this.”

Two weeks later, Lord Selkirk sent another dispatch stating “it would be wise to make arrests of communists in Singapore as soon as possible”.

Contraries to what PM Lee said

December 15, 2014

I refer to the 10 Dec 2014 Straits Times report “Rallying party for next GE”.

Contrary to what PM Lee said, the PAP doesn’t always deal with the problems they face. More often than not, they conveniently explain problems away. They don’t lie low, they lie.
Their so called settle now is to give excuses. Instead of hoping that the public forgets the problem, they hope the public remembers their excuses.

For example, between 2007 and 2011, the public could obviously see housing prices running out of control. But PAP kept explaining the problem away. First they insisted it was the natural outcome of demand and supply which the government had no control over. Then they rationalized it wasn’t a problem at all and that correcting it was tantamount to robbing from state reserves. But immediately after the election setback of 2011, suddenly both housing demand and supply can be controlled, with measure after measure to rein in both demand and supply. Discounts to new flats were also increased, never mind it reduced already heavy inflows to state reserves. That’s how the PAP operates; explain problems away first rather than solve them first.

Contrary to what PM Lee said, PAP doesn’t behave as though it owes people responsibility. Instead, it behaves as though people owe them our First World status despite the fact that Singapore was already very prosperous as a British Crown Colony and became more so under the economic plan written by Dr Albert Winsemius.

Contrary to what PM Lee said, PAP is neither transparent nor accountable. It continues to hide behind the safety of state controlled media that shield it from answering really tough questions that transparency and accountability calls for.

PM Lee knows no shame when he asked other political parties to measure up to PAP’s lowly standards. It is not up to PM Lee but Singaporeans to decide who is up to the mark and who falls short. Neither PM Lee nor the PAP sets the mark. PM Lee’s own mark is less than half past six (60.5%).

Straits Times, Rallying party for next GE, 10 Dec 2014

PRIME Minister Lee Hsien Loong, at the PAP rally on Sunday, touched on these topics:

ON LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION

“We will reinforce the team further in the next General Election. We have already identified many promising candidates, including a few potential office holders. Some from the private sector; some in the government; quite a number from the activists, from the grassroots, men, women, different age groups, different races. A good representation of Singapore and the way Singapore’s leadership should be.

Of course, the elections are still a bit off yet and we have not stopped and will not stop looking for good men and women who can join us. So, after the next General Election, with the support of the voters, I will have a renewed, strengthened and more seasoned team of MPs, and of ministers.

Whoever will succeed me as Secretary-General and Prime Minister, will most likely be amongst the PAP MPs elected in the next General Election….Well before the end of next term, I am confident we will have a younger, passionate and capable team, ready to take over the reins”.

ON OPPOSITION PARTIES

“When we face problems, we acknowledge them publicly and deal with them. We do not pretend there is no problem – no comment, studying the matter, thinking about it, we’ll clarify one day. We settle now! You lie low, hoping the public will forget the issue and the issue will go away and the public will forget you, and you might as well go away.

Because we are the People’s Action Party, we owe a responsibility to the people, to be honest, to be transparent, and to be accountable. In fact, it is our responsibility to set the standard that other political parties in Singapore should be measured by and should aim for. I cannot tell them what they should aim for, but I can tell you who is up to the mark and who falls short. And we have to set that mark.”

ON POLITICAL BATTLES

“This is democracy. People are entitled to try. It is the way the system works or is supposed to work. But for democracy to really, truly work in Singapore, the PAP also must fight, and fight to win the battle. Because if the other side fights and we sit down and we are good guys and nice and friendly to everyone, I think we deserve to lose. We are friendly, yes. To win, we must fight for what we believe in. If you get flamed, so what? I have the thickest skin in town and if you are doing the right thing and if 10,000 people go against you, proceed. We are charging in the right direction.”

Next General Election will not be a fight to see who forms government

December 14, 2014

I refer to the 8 Dec 2014 Straits Times report “Next General Election will be a fight to see who forms government: PM Lee”.

Was PM Lee trying to pull a fast one when he said the next general election is about who forms the government? Even Mr Ho Kwong Ping who delivered the first two Institute of Policy Study lectures said it was unlikely that PAP’s dominance can be challenged in the next 15 years.

What did PM Lee mean when he said the next general election is going to be a deadly serious fight? Was he implying that previous general elections were play play only?

PM Lee can try to frame his next election campaign around a First World government all he wants but that will not extinguish the people’s yearning for a First World parliament. The people has come to appreciate what PM Lee’s supposed First World government is – a government of self praise that is no praise. The people are gradually coming to realise that without a First World parliament, their welfare and their children’s future cannot be safeguarded despite PM Lee’s so-called First World government.

PM Lee can try to frame every contest as a national one, not a local one. But he should not forget that the Workers’ Party won Aljunied without significant local issues to capitalize on, without the by-election effect. Instead, Workers’ Party won Aljunied on the back of national, not local issues.

PM Lee is mistaken if he thinks that the people will identify with his motherhood vision statements about a fair and inclusive society. PAP’s motherhood statements cannot change the people’s daily encounters with the realities of societal unfairness and exclusion.

PM Lee is deluding himself if he thinks that only PAP solves problems. PAP creates more problems than it solves while the people are largely left to solving for themselves whatever problems PAP has created. After all, isn’t it the PAP’s mantra all these years that the people must be self-reliant as encapsulated in one of its all time classic phrases “Do you want three meals in a hawker centre, food court or restaurant”?

PM Lee’s vision and road map is meaningless to the average man on the street. The average man on the street cannot see vision statements as anything beyond meaningless motherhood statements. They see bread, butter, roof and cash better.

PM Lee should quit fooling himself; he does not have the thickest skin but the thinnest skin in town for over reacting to a blog that the common man on the street couldn’t care less about.

Straits Times, Next General Election will be a fight to see who forms government: PM Lee, 8 Dec 2014

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said Singapore’s next General Election (GE) will be about who forms the government to implement policies to take the country forward.

“The next GE is going to be a deadly serious fight,” Mr Lee told 6,000 members of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) yesterday at its 60th anniversary rally at the Singapore Expo.

“It will be about whether we continue to have a First World Government, not about the so-called First World Parliament,” he said, alluding to the Workers’ Party’s (WP’s) GE 2011 slogan.

“Every seat, every contest will be a national one, not a local one,” he said in a rousing hour- long speech in Malay, Mandarin and English. What will be at stake in every constituency will be who gets to form the government, rather than the by-election effect often used by the opposition to secure more seats, he argued.

The next election must be held by January 2017, and Mr Lee said it would be about choosing a “clear vision” and “capable leadership” for the nation. “It is not just about expressing approval or disapproval, it is not just about winning a seat in Parliament, it is not a by-election,” he said.

The party, he said, would fight to win every seat – and this included WP-held Aljunied GRC, Hougang and Punggol East.

Going on the offensive against opposition parties, Mr Lee accused them of offering no vision for Singapore, even as he outlined the PAP’s updated objectives for an inclusive and fair nation with citizens who are hard-working and actively engaged.

These goals, adopted as a resolution during the party’s convention last year, were crystallised in the party’s Constitution yesterday. It was the first amendment to the Constitution in 32 years.

The change cements the PAP’s shift in governance over the past decade towards more communication with the public and stronger social support, said Mr Lee, the party’s secretary-general.

Noting that the PAP is the only party offering a national vision, he said: “Only the PAP is solving problems, planning for the future. Only the PAP is putting forth a vision, a road map for Singapore.”

Meanwhile, he urged PAP activists to stand up for their ideas, even if they are criticised. Telling them to have courage, he quipped: “If I get flamed, so what; I have the thickest skin in town.”

Institute of Policy Studies senior research fellow Gillian Koh noted that the WP had fought on a platform of being the PAP’s check and balance in the last GE.

“The challenge seems to be whether it can do the local part well,” she added, referring to recent hitches in the WP’s management of its town council.

The PAP also held elections for its central executive committee yesterday, for what is likely to be the last time before the GE.

Manpower Minister Tan Chuan-Jin made it into the committee’s top 12, replacing Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen. Dr Ng was co-opted into the committee with Speaker Halimah Yacob, as the two nominees with the next highest number of votes.

For the next GE, the PAP has identified “many promising candidates”, including potential office-holders, Mr Lee said, adding that his successor is likely to be in the “renewed, strengthened and more seasoned” team that will be in place after the next polls.

Not enough checks yet to cause checkmate

December 13, 2014

I refer to the 8 Dec 2014 Straits Times report “Too many checks ‘will lead to checkmate'”.

PM Lee is wrong to say that the opposition does not see its duty to solve the nation’s problems or plan for the future:

• The Singapore Democratic Party launched its national housing plan and national healthcare plan in Nov 2012 and Jan this year respectively to solve our nation’s housing and healthcare problems respectively.

• Both Workers Party and the National Solidarity Party launched their papers and plans for a sustainable population in 2013 to solve population problems caused by the PAP.

• The Reform Party launched its 5 year master plan in 2011 to plan for a brighter future in 2016

PM Lee should not see the checker in parliament as negating the efforts of the government doer, thinker or leader. Conversely, parliament checkers help the government doer do the right thing; they help the government thinker crystallize his or her thoughts better, they help the government leader lead better. The checker has, after all, always served the utmost important role of being the last stop in the line.

PM Lee cannot say there are lots of checkers in parliament when only 10 MPs are active checkers (WP + SPP) while close to 80 are sleeping or absent checkers (PAP). If PM Lee discount the 80 sleeping or absent checkers, he will find there aren’t so many checkers around to cause gridlock or checkmate.

But from time to time, these 80 sleeping or absent checkers can spring into action and become counter checkers. With 80 counter checkers against 10 active checkers, the odds are firmly in PM Lee’s favour. What has PM Lee to fear? Are PM Lee’s policies so flimsy, so indefensible, so easily checkable that it cannot prevail despite an 8 to 1 odd?

No reasonable person will believe that PAP will be checkmated in the coming election. In a recent public lecture, Mr Ho Kwong Ping made the point that PAP won’t be checkmated in the next 15 years. Would Seoul give PM Lee honorary citizenship if it thinks PM Lee’s government is about to be checkmated? The most likely reason why PM Lee would warn against PAP being checkmated is to scare the sizeable electoral middle ground which happens to be the most gullible also.

The opposition asks the PAP to do more because the PAP isn’t doing enough.

Almost every year, the PAP takes from the country billions of dollars more than it spends on it. The money for doing more can come from the billions more that the PAP takes from the country every year.

There is no need for PM Lee to take issue with the opposition over the lack of vision statements which tend to be useless motherhood statements anyway. For example, PAP’s vision of a Swiss Standard of Living quickly turned out to be a household joke. Singaporeans don’t need and don’t care about useless motherhood vision statements.

PM Lee should understand that government surpluses that helped fund the $8 billion Pioneer Generation Package did not come from his own pocket but from the pockets of Singaporeans. The spike in housing prices meant that Singaporeans paid more for housing that ultimately went into government surpluses. The availability of vast amounts of cheap CPF funds also helped fuel government investments that helped earn extra surpluses. PM Lee cannot take credit for the surpluses that ultimately came from the people. In spiking housing prices, PAP is ultimately mortgaging our children’s future to win votes because our children will be paying even more in future for ever smaller living spaces.

PM Lee doesn’t know what First World parliament is because he has never been part of one. By the time he was inducted into politics, Singapore parliament has already degenerated into Third World status. PM Lee should not shamelessly associate himself with our achievement of First World nation status but should instead acknowledge that Singapore didn’t progress to First World status under his watch but under the watch of his predecessors.

PM Lee should correct his mistaken notion that PAP also fighting means democracy will truly work in Singapore. More importantly, PAP must fight fairly and squarely in order for Singapore democracy to truly work. PAP fighting with unfair, self-assigned advantages is insulting and contemptuous to Singapore democracy.

PM Lee should quit being hypocritical. Since when in PAP’s history has it ever been the good, nice, friendly guy? Would nice guys lock up opponents for 30 over years without the permission of the courts?

Straits Times, Too many checks ‘will lead to checkmate’, 8 Dec 2014

Singapore’s opposition parties do not see it as their duty to solve the nation’s problems and plan for the future, said Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.

Instead, their main campaigning platform is to act as a “check” on the ruling party, he said at a People’s Action Party (PAP) rally held after the party’s biennial conference yesterday.

But for every “checker” in Parliament, there will be one fewer “doer, thinker and leader” in the government, said Mr Lee, who is the PAP’s secretary-general.

“You will have a lot of checkers, you have no workers… There will be gridlock, like in other countries,” he said.

Singapore’s opposition parties do not see it as their duty to solve the nation’s problems and plan for the future, says Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. — ST PHOTO: CAROLINE CHIA
“Eventually, there will be no PAP to check… That will be the last check, because it will be checkmate for Singapore.”

In a speech that pulled no punches in criticising the opposition, Mr Lee said that every time the PAP Government puts out a popular policy, opposition politicians respond: “Do more.”

But they fail to suggest where the money will come from, or “who are you going to ‘take from’ in order to ‘give more’ “, he said.

Mr Lee also chided opposition politicians for not putting forth a vision for Singapore, saying it is “because they are trying to avoid answering hard questions”.

The PAP, on the other hand, delivers on its promises and thinks long term, he added. Citing the $8 billion Pioneer Generation Package, which was funded from the surpluses of a single term of government rather than future taxes, he said the ruling party will not “mortgage your children’s future to win your votes”.

Taking a jab at the 2011 election slogan of the Workers’ Party (WP) – the biggest opposition party in Parliament – Mr Lee said: “When other people say First World Parliament, we don’t know what it means.” He added to loud cheers: “But when we say First World Nation – here we are.”

Yesterday, Mr Lee also urged PAP activists to greater action in the lead-up to the next general election (GE), especially in opposition-held wards.

The WP currently controls Aljunied GRC, Hougang and Punggol East – the biggest opposition haul since independence.

Mr Lee said that in June, he visited several thousand Aljunied residents, who gave him a rousing welcome. Pledging to win the opposition constituencies back, he said: “It may take some time, but we will not give up trying and, one day, we will succeed.”

He pointed to the example of PAP MP Sitoh Yih Pin, who wrested Potong Pasir back from the opposition on his third try.

Madam Normah Ahmad, 62, a Kaki Bukit activist, agreed: “We should try to win back Aljunied, slowly, if we have to. It is a hard fight, but I think we can.”

Activists must also toughen up for the next GE, Mr Lee said.

“For democracy really, truly to work in Singapore, the PAP also must fight, and fight to win the battle,” he said. “Because if we sit down and we are good guys and nice and friendly to everybody, I think we deserve to lose.”


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